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E PLURIBUS UNUM: LIBERALISM’S MARCH TO BE THE SINGULAR 





Rogers Smith writes that American political culture can best be understood as a 
blend of liberal, republican, and illiberal ascriptive ideologies.
1
 The United States 
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has largely reflected this thesis. 
While the Court moved away from permitting laws that explicitly construct 
hierarchies in the twentieth century
2
  and made tepid references to egalitarian 
principles during the Warren Court,
3
 liberalism has prevailed in the majority of the 
Court’s decisions.
4
 Gains in civil rights through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Clauses were achieved primarily 
through liberal notions of deregulation, a market economy, and individual 
freedom.
5
 Conversely, State Action, both invidious and benign, has been curtailed 
by the Court’s invalidation of illiberal practices and its neo-liberal intent over 
impact and color-blind doctrines that strike down remedial State programs. For 
explicitly constructed hierarchies, such as race, the result is an illusory equal 
opportunity, not equal results, approach that solidifies the vestiges of past illiberal 
practices, converting the neo-liberalism of the present into an ascriptive ideology 
that preserves the hierarchies of the past. For indiscrete minorities not subject to the 
same comprehensive and pervasive hierarchies, a neo-liberal approach to 
individual freedom uncompromised by illiberal state animosities toward groups 
may help to serve the promise of civil rights.  
PART I:  LIBERALISM 
A.   Introduction: Rogers Smith’s Multiple Traditions 
Rogers Smith writes in Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: The Multiple 
Traditions in America that American politics has been frequently described as 
 ________________________  
 * Aaron J Shuler, U.S. History Teacher, St. Paul Academy and Summit School. University of Wisconsin-
Madison, B.A., 2000, University of Minnesota Law School, J.D., 2003, Universidad de Navarra, D.E.A., 2009. 
Thank you to Michael Faherty for his feedback, encouragement, and tireless attendance at Rennie’s. 
 1. Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America, 87 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 549, 549 (1993). 
 2. See id. at 550. 
 3. ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136 (2d ed. 1990). 
 4. See Smith, supra note 1, at 550.   
 5. Id. at 550, 563. 
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being predominately shaped and defined by liberal democratic principles.
6
 Scholars 
from Hector St. John Crevecoeur
7
 in the eighteenth century, Harriet Martineau
8
 in 
the nineteenth, Gunnar Myrdal
9
 and Louis Hartz
10
 in the twentieth, and up to the 
more recent work of legal scholars such as Kenneth Karst,
11
 follow this basic 
model launched by Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.
12
 Smith’s Multiple 
Traditions view, however, asserts that “American politics is best seen as expressing 
the interaction of multiple political traditions, including liberalism, republicanism, 
and ascriptive forms of Americanism, which have collectively comprised American 
political culture, without any constituting it as a whole.”
13
 
Smith sees this blend of disparate traditions resulting in drastic, pervasive, and 
persistent hierarchies that define American political culture.
14
 He takes issue with 
the narrow Tocquevillian conclusion that the United States was more egalitarian 
than Europe because it lacked the traditional ascriptive hierarchies of monarchy 
and hereditary.
15
 Instead, Smith highlights a United States that favored a minority 
of propertied white men at the country’s inception and ascription based on race, 
sex, and religion going forward.
16
 Moreover, these hierarchies were not sequestered 
among “the poor and uneducated white people in isolated and backward rural areas 
of the deep South,”
17
 as asserted by Gunnar Myrdal; but, they were implemented 
and defended by “American intellectual and political elites elaborat[ing] distinctive 
justifications . . . including inegalitarian scriptural readings, the scientific racism of 
the ‘American school’ of ethnology, racial and sexual Darwinism, and the romantic 
cult of Anglo-Saxonism in American historiography.”
18
 As a result, “for over 
eighty percent of U.S. history, its laws declared most of the world’s population to 
be ineligible for full American citizenship,”
19
 and a firmly-entrenched hierarchy 
 ________________________  
 6. Id. at 549. 
 7. See generally J. HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CREVECOEUR, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER (Penguin 
Books 1981) (1782) (a Frenchman actually predating Tocqueville struck by a radical new nation’s allergy to 
government in favor of the individual). 
 8. See generally HARRIET MARTINEAU, SOCIETY IN AMERICA (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) (1837) (an 
English woman expressing some of the earliest charges of hypocrisy against a sexist, racist nation purporting to be 
a liberal democracy).  
 9. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (Harper & Row 1944) (another non-American detailing the exclusionary tendencies of liberal 
American democracy). 
 10. See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (Harcourt, Brace & World 1955) (the reigning postwar 
theorist on American political culture explaining American democracy as an unrivaled tradition in the United 
States born from a revolutionary liberal consensus free from having to shed the antiquated ideologies of the Old 
World). 
 11. See generally KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION  (Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835) (the prolific Professor Karst detailing the history of excluding 
people from an ostensibly liberal American democracy). 
 12. Smith, supra note 1, at 549. 
 13. Id. at 550. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. at 549, 551. 
 16. Smith, supra note 1, at 553. 
 17. Id. at 551. 
 18. Id. at 549. 
 19. Id. 
2
Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/3
Fall 2013 E Pluribus Unum: Liberalism's March 51 
 
with white Protestant men sitting atop prevailed, justified by “creditable 
intellectual and psychological reasons . . . [based in] nature, history, and God.”
20
 
This article seeks to apply Smith’s Multiple Traditions thesis to the United 
States Supreme Court’s treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment to uncover the 
influences behind its major civil rights decisions. It will argue that liberalism 
dominates at the Court after mostly, but not completely, shedding its illiberal 
tendencies. Specifically, it will discuss how tepid and mostly abandoned overtures 
to republicanism and egalitarianism during the Warren Court have resulted in 
Smith’s warning about how “the possibility that novel intellectual, political, and 
legal systems reinforcing racial, ethnic, and gender inequalities might be rebuilt in 
America in the years ahead” has come to fruition in the Supreme Court’s equal 
protection doctrine.
21
 This article will argue that the Court’s focus on intent over 
impact and its “color-blind” approach to racial classifications in the era of 
subterranean prejudice and indifference or ignorance to inequality solidifies and 
perpetuates the hierarchies created by ascriptive forms of Americanism under the 
Court’s liberal notions of “equal laws, not equal results.”
22
 In addition to Smith’s 
warning, the Court’s unwillingness to confront its complicity in the perpetuation of 
hierarchy recalls James Baldwin’s indictment of the “disavowal of domination,” an 
“ironic innocence” due not to “excusable ignorance but a blindness that is culpable 
because it is willful.”
23
 It is this ironic innocence about the Court’s ascriptive past 
that renders intent-neutral and color-blind approaches in the present illiberal 
reinforcements of old ascriptive orders.
24
 
This article will also discuss how regardless of whether the Equal Protection 
Clause—traditionally associated with equality—or the Substantive Due Process 
Clause—generally identified with liberty—is invoked, liberal conceptions of 
rights—as opposed to egalitarian notions of equality—are the driving force behind 
the Court’s jurisprudence.
25
 Under this analysis, landmark civil rights decisions 
appearing to vindicate principles of equality under both the Equal Protection and 
Substantive Due Process Clauses are better understood as a validation of individual 
rights in an unregulated market economy. Out of many competing traditions 
informing the Court’s decisions over time—liberalism, illiberal ascription based on 
race, sex, religion, and sexuality, and to a lesser and briefer extent republicanism 
and egalitarianism—one tradition emerges as dominant at the Court: liberalism.
26
 
 ________________________  
 20. Id. at 550. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). See infra note 54. 
 23. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME IN THE PRICE OF THE TICKET: JAMES BALDWIN COLLECTED 
NON-FICTION 335–36 (1985), reprinted in GEORGE SHULMAN, AMERICAN PROPHECY: RACE AND REDEMPTION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 143 (2008). 
 24. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1 at 549. 
 25. Despite the likely great expectations that John Bingham and the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
had, and scholarly calls for long overdue recognition, the continued irrelevancy of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause after the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), means that it will be left out of this article. For an 
insightful, comprehensive analysis of the historical underpinnings and appropriate modern applications of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
SUPREME COURT (2001). 
 26. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 549. 
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B. The Liberal Tradition 
1.   Liberalism and the State 
In Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Rogers Smith explains that, 
“[a]lthough their priorities varied, proponents of the political vision of the 
moderate [Lockean] Enlightenment, including most of America’s founding 
generation, accepted that government should be redirected away from prescribing 
religious, moral, or martial virtue to secular ends of peace, economic growth and 
prosperity, intellectual progress, and personal liberty.”
27
 Although there was no 
singular conception of liberalism,  
not only the founding Federalists but even the Anti-Federalists, 
who were influenced by the civically oriented republican tradition, 
still were liberals in the ‘decisive sense’ of seeing ‘the end of 
government as the security of individual liberty, not the promotion 
of virtue or the fostering of some organic common good.’
28
  
While the republican tradition of civic engagement that Smith discusses in 
Liberalism and American Constitutional Law and The Multiple Traditions in 
America provokes debates about the “‘fundamental contradiction’ of modern (if not 
human) existence—the impossibility of realizing . . . conflicting aspirations for 
both personal and communal freedom,”
29
 American constitutional rights have been 
primarily defined by liberal and illiberal ascriptive tendencies.
30
 
Similarly, Mary Ann Glendon argues that the triumph of Lockean liberalism 
over notions of republican virtue has led to a rigid zero-sum rights discourse that 
demands rights be “absolute, individual, and independent of any necessary relation 
to responsibilities.”
31
 Glendon attributes rights discourse to the heavy influence of 
Anglo natural rights theorists John Locke and Thomas Hobbes,
32
 unleavened by the 
continental concern for responsibility espoused by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Immanuel Kant.
33
 Moreover, William Blackstone’s out-sized influence
34
 on 
American jurisprudence, and his fixation on property as the “cardinal symbol of 
individual freedom and independence in the United States,”
35
 goes a long way in 
 ________________________  
 27. SMITH, supra note 3, at 3 (citing HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA 88–101 (1976)). 
 28. Id. at 14 (citing MAY, supra note 27, at 88–90). See also GORDON S. WOOD, HEROICS 28 (1981). 
 29. SMITH, supra note 3, at 8. 
 30. See Eric J. Mitnick, Three Models of Group-Differentiated Rights, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215, 
238–41 (2004). 
 31. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 12 (1991). 
 32. See, e.g., RICHARD PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 49 (1999) (discussing the four 
movements of liberal rights: Hobbes, Locke, Nozick, and Rawls). 
 33. GLENDON, supra note 31, at 13. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1968); 
IMMANUEL KANT, IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY WITH A COSMOPOLITAN PURPOSE (2d ed. 1991). 
 34. GLENDON, supra note 31, at 23 (explaining that Blackstone’s Commentaries was often the only legal 
source available to colonial and post-colonial lawyers in eighteenth century America before decisions of American 
courts became available early in the nineteenth century). 
 35. Id. at 24. 
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explaining the bedrock of American liberalism and its later influence on 
constitutional rights.  
While English notions of freehold over real property “stirred [Blackstone’s] 
lawyerly soul,”
36
 the principle, if not the exact form, would resonate centuries later. 
Although a “decline in overt legal solicitude for traditional types of property 
rights”
37
 may have occurred in the twentieth century, classical liberal notions of 
real property’s influence on American constitutional jurisprudence have been 
replaced by liberal conceptions of profit and privacy as property that continue to 
dominate American constitutional rights jurisprudence.
38
 “Privacy was,” Glendon 
argues, “quite literally, pulled from the hat of property” by Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis;
39
 Glendon continues to argue that property rights decisions 
protecting private letters and lecture notes rested on notions of “inviolate 
personality” contained within the writings.
40
 The “right to be let alone” combined 
“the traditional idea of property as marking off a sphere around the individual 
which no one could enter without permission . . . a fortiori [that sphere] must 
surround the man [in that sphere] and his interior life.”
41
 
The United States Supreme Court’s civil rights decisions largely reflect Smith 
and Glendon’s explication of liberalism’s origins and continued hold on American 
political and legal life.
42
 Smith’s assertions, that illiberal ascriptive policies played 
a prominent role in American political culture, are consistently illustrated in the 
Court’s thinking well into the twentieth century,
43
 while the few victories for civil 
rights in the nineteenth and early twentieth century were provided by liberal 
conceptions of property and individualism.
44
 Less persuasive is Smith’s claim that 
republicanism is a significant part of the multiple traditions that comprise 
American political culture, at least with respect to the Court’s civil rights 
decisions.
45
 With the exception of a brief foray into tepid republican and egalitarian 
concerns by the Warren Court, the broader picture of the Court’s approach to civil 
rights is more accurately characterized by Glendon’s absolutist rights rhetoric. 
Moreover, regardless of whether the Court relied on the Equal Protection or 
Substantive Due Process Clauses, civil rights are best understood and effectively 
secured through the language of liberalism.
46
 A survey of the Court’s major civil 
 ________________________  
 36. Id. at 23. 
 37. Id. at 30. 
 38. Id. at 30, 32. 
 39. Id. at 51. 
 40. GLENDON, supra note 31, at 51. 
 41. Id. at 52. 
 42. See generally Smith, supra note 1 (arguing that while scholars have seen the nation as a liberal 
democratic society, American political culture can be better understood to be the product of multiple traditions). 
See also GLENDON, supra note 31 (tracing the particular American rights discourse back to disproportionately 
influential Anglo natural rights theorists such as Locke and Blackstone).  
 43. See generally Smith, supra note 1.  
 44. See infra notes 79–172 (discussing civil rights cases and their relation to liberal conceptions of property 
and individualism). 
 45. See Smith, supra note 1, at 551. 
 46. Civil rights have certainly been achieved through other constitutional clauses, not to mention statutory 
schemes, but the focus of this article are the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Substantive Due 
Process Clauses. The broader point, that American political culture, specifically the Court’s jurisprudence, is best 
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rights decisions over the past one hundred years
47
 illustrates a nearly monolithic 
liberal approach to civil rights that promises to strike down barriers to equal 
opportunity in the present while preserving those of the past. 
2.   Liberalism and the Supreme Court 
While substantive due process can arguably be found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the concept of due process in general dates back much further than its 
enshrining in the Constitution.
48
 The doctrine’s development in the United States,
49
 
both before and after its appearance in the Fourteenth Amendment, has led to the 
understanding that it consists of two parts.
50
 Procedural due process ensures that an 
individual is afforded meaningful court processes before her life, liberty, or 
property is taken. The second component, substantive due process, derives from 
liberal principles that evolved into a doctrine that protects individual rights not 
specifically listed in the text of the Constitution against State encroachment,
51
 no 
matter how democratically enacted.
52
 Its name, then, is misleading, or even 
  
viewed as a creature of liberalism, is also of course not limited to the Fourteenth Amendment or civil rights. To 
note just one example, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) persuasively 
demonstrates how the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an act ostensibly passed to address racially-constructed ascription, 
was validated by the Court, not through the Reconstruction Amendments that had been previously gutted in The 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), as an endorsement of racial equality, but through the Commerce Clause as 
legitimate federal legislation eliminating local illiberal regulation of the national economy. 
 47. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925). 
 48. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 99, 103 (2007) (noting that the concept of due process as “the law of the land” likely has its roots in the 
English Magna Carta of 1215). 
 49. Due process’ American conception can be traced back to Lockean and Jeffersonian political theory. 
Davin J. Hall, Not So Landmark After All? Lawrence v. Texas: Classical Liberalism and Due Process 
Jurisprudence, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 617, 617 (2004) (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 
2 (U.S. 1776); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 123 (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1980) (1690) 
(“Civil Society’s ends are ‘the mutual preservation of [citizens’] lives, liberties and estates.’”)). 
 50. See Hall, supra note 49, at 617  
 51. James W. Ely Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due 
Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 320 (1999). While the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from 
infringing upon a person’s procedural and substantive due process rights, the Fifth Amendment is directed at the 
Federal Government. Guarantees from both amendments date back to protection against arbitrary action from the 
King in the Magna Carta. 
 52. Rebecca Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1496 (2002) (citing Republic 
Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“The basic question here is really 
one of substantive due process.”)). The term “substantive due process” is thought to have had its first use in 1948. 
See Ely, supra note 51, at 319 (noting that the first Supreme Court justice used the term “substantive due process” 
in 1948). The concept under a different name—or no name at all—goes back much further, including in the 
infamous decision of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Chief Justice Taney held that  
[a]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he 
came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no 
offense against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process.  
60 U.S. at 450. But see Ely, supra note 51, at 318 (noting that the use of the doctrine goes back much further than 
Dred Scott, repudiating Professor Bork’s assertion that Dred Scott is “the fountainhead of substantive due 
process”). Other arguments based on substantive due process before the Civil War and the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment inverted Justice Taney’s conception and argued that “slavery was a deprivation of liberty 
without a proper basis in law (such as conviction for crime).” KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 364 (16th ed. 2007). 
6
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contradictory, considering that no amount of process—due or otherwise—can 
extinguish certain rights guaranteed by liberalism.
53
 Despite Substantive Due 
Process’ ambiguous language, it nevertheless is thought to give the Due Process 






The notion of fundamental rights in the United States, similar to due process’ 
long documented existence, has also been around since its inception—including 
appearing in the country’s founding document.
56
 Calder v. Bull
57
 was the first 
decision of the United States Supreme Court that discussed the idea of “implied 
rights.”
58
 Howard Gillman writes that these “implied” or unenumerated rights have 
always been controversial;
59
 but, going all the way back to Calder, Justice Chase 
wrote about “certain vital principles in our free Republican governments that were 
not expressly restrained by the Constitution.”
60
 Justice Chase refused to “subscribe 
to the omnipotence of a State Legislature,” or accept that “it is absolute and 
without control.”
61
 Fletcher v. Peck
62
 is another early case that considered vested 
rights that had not been enumerated in the Constitution. Justice Marshall alluded to 
these “unwritten constitutional principles as an alternative basis for his decision in 
Fletcher.”
63
 And Corfield v. Coryell
64
 is thought to be the first decision to 
explicitly use the term “fundamental rights” in the American constitutional 
tradition.
65
 Justice Washington’s opinion in Corfield explained that these 
fundamental rights belonged to citizens of free government.
66
 Although 
 ________________________  
 53. Compare JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980) (referring to substantive due process 
as on par with saying “green pastel redness”), and ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (describing substantive due process as a “momentous sham”), and Ellis v. 
Hamilton, 669 F.2d. 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (referring to substantive due process as that “ubiquitous oxymoron”) 
with Ely, supra note 51, at 320 (arguing that the notion of due process having both a procedural and substantive 
component goes all the way back to 1215 England). 
 54. The Court’s experience in discerning, declaring and explaining the nature of rights—fundamental or 
otherwise—has been as muddled as its adventures in clarifying the substantive due process doctrine. This is 
unsurprising considering the two areas greatly overlap. This work will discuss many of the fundamental rights 
cases, but it will not specifically broach the topic in a descriptive or normative manner. 
 55. Ely, supra note 51, at 320 (citing WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 60–63 (4th ed. 
1927) (suggesting that history supports a reading that the concept of due process entails both procedure and 
substance); EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS 11 (1996); FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND 
NONSENSE 5–7 (1986). 
 56. The Declaration of Independence specifically mentions “unalienable rights.” THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 57. 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
 58. E.g., Howard Gillman, Regime Politics, Jurisprudential Regimes, and Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 107, 110 (2006) (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 394). 
 59. See id. at 118. 
 60. See id. at 110. 
 61. Calder, 3 U.S. at 387–88. See also SULLIVAN, supra note 52, at 363. 
 62. 10 U.S. 87 (1810). 
 63. Gillman, supra note 58, at 110. 
 64. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa.1823). 
 65. Howard J. Vogel, The Ordered Liberty of Substantive Due Process and the Future of Constitutional 
Law as a Rhetorical Art: Variations on a Theme from Justice Cardozo in the United States Supreme Court , 70 
ALB. L. REV. 1473, 1479 (2007). 
 66. Id. (citing Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52).   
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unenumerated, they could be described as, amongst other things, “the enjoyment of 
life and liberty,” and considered to be “privileges and immunities.”
67
 
Despite the lack of express textual support within the document itself,
68
 
advocates of the preservation and protection of fundamental rights would later 
ground their arguments in the Constitution after the Court’s early and uncertain 
jurisprudence exemplified by Calder.
69
 Initially it was thought that unenumerated 
rights would find refuge in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
70
 The Slaughter-House Cases
71
 rejected and effectively ended this 
idea over Justice Bradley’s dissent,
72
 arguably stripping the Fourteenth 
Amendment of one of its primary purposes.
73
 Despite rejection of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause being a home for substantive due process arguments,
74
 the 
doctrine continued to be utilized, based in the Fourteenth Amendment generally.
75
 
The use of the Ninth Amendment’s catchall language,
76
 that reserved rights not 
expressly given to the Federal Government for the people has appealed to some,
77
 
yet never enjoyed an abundance of support. The Substantive Due Process Clause 
would later stand in its place to guarantee those rights.
78
 
 ________________________  
 67. Id. at 1479. The privileges and immunities referred to in this particular opinion being from Article IV 
of the United States Constitution as opposed to that of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 68. Id. at 1477.  
 69. 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
 70. Mitchell F. Park, Defining One’s Own Conception of Existence and the Meaning of the Universe: The 
Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 837, 841–43 (2006) (citing RANDY E. 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 60, 61 (2003)). Representative 
John Bingham, author of the Fourteenth Amendment, “used the words privileges and immunities as a shorthand 
description of fundamental or constitutional rights that state legislatures could not abridge.” This is again in 
contrast to the Clause found in Article IV § 2, which reads: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” 
 71. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 72. Id. at 116. Justice Bradley argued that a citizen’s right to choose was an element of liberty that could 
not be arbitrarily assailed. 
 73. Karst, supra note 48, at 105–06. See also Park, supra note 70, at 843–44 (noting that the Slaughter-
House Cases “eviscerated” Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
 74. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), breathed some new life into the clause but it has yet to—and likely 
never will—fulfill what many considered to be its equal citizenship purpose. See David H. Gans, The Unitary 
Fourteenth Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 907, 908–09 (2007). 
 75. See, e.g., Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“The paternal theory 
of government is to me odious. The utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible protection to 
him and his property, is both the limitation and duty of government.”); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877) 
(“[In matters] in which the public has no interest, what is reasonable must be ascertained judicially”); The 
Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 345–46 (1886) (power of State to regulate is limited); Chicago v. 
Minn. & Warehouse Comm’n, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890) (reasonableness of State action is “eminently a question 
for judicial investigation”); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (Court may examine substantive 
reasonableness of state legislation). 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. (“The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed 
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).  
 77. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (citing but not exclusively relying on Ninth Amendment). 
 78. See Park, supra note 70, at 844–45. 
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C. Liberalism and the Fourteenth Amendment 
1.   Liberalism v. De Jure Discrimination 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was never as 
effective and exacting as its strongest proponents may have wanted it to be, but it 
did enjoy qualified success after its ratification in 1868.
79
 It was most successful in 
striking down blatant, unexplainable on any grounds other than invidious 
discrimination in statutory language or application by State actors.
80
 It was far less 
capable of addressing barely subtle discrimination or outright hostility by pseudo-
state actors that frequently fell outside of a scope that was quickly strangled after 
ratification in the Civil Rights Cases.
81
 Justice Bradley’s eight-to-one majority 
opinion declared that, “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject 
matter of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”
82
 Denials to public inns, conveyances, or 
places of amusement are mere acts of individuals that would be subject, if at all, to 
any laws the State might make.
83
 The victories for civil rights that it did achieve 
over State discrimination—notwithstanding titular assumptions about equal 
protection being about “equality”—came through liberalism’s language of 
individual rights.  
Thus the Equal Protection Clause was able to invalidate a facially biased 
statute in West Virginia v. Strauder
84
 that prohibited blacks from serving on juries. 
West Virginia’s law fell not because of concerns for equal representation in the 
jury box, nor was it a matter of blacks and whites being equal arbiters of the law.
85
 
The law was struck down because the Court found that a black man had a right to 
not have the possibility of having other blacks hear his case completely and 
expressly foreclosed by law.
86
 Strauder may appear to be a tepid repudiation of de 
jure racial banishment from the jury box, but instead is best seen as a meek 
expression of the constitutional right to a jury of one’s peers or at least recognition 
that the State cannot interfere and outright prohibit blacks from having the right to 
the possibility of racial peers judging them.
87
 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
88
 a statute 
ostensibly governing the safety of dry cleaning establishments was facially neutral, 
but had been enforced every time against Chinese Americans and not once against 
 ________________________  
 79. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unfulfilled 
Promise, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1143, 1155–56 (1992). 
 80. See, e.g., id. 
 81. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (discussing how the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments are not meant to redress “ordinary civil injuries”). 
 82. Id. at 11. 
 83. Id. at 24. 
 84. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 85. Id. See also Swain v. Alabama, 390 U.S. 202 (1965) (rejecting a constitutional entitlement to racial 
proportionality in juries). 
 86. 100 U.S. at 312. 
 87. Other interpretations argue that Strauder was about the right to serve on a jury regardless of race. See 
RICHARD PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 170, 171 (1999) (discussing Akhil Amar, The Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L. J. 1193, 1209 (1992) (characterizing jury service as a “right,” 
despite the West Virginia statute’s language)). 
 88. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
9
: E Pluribus Unum: Liberalism's March
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2013




 The Court’s ruling focused not on the equality of Chinese 
Americans, but on striking down dual illiberal violations of individual rights and 
overregulation to vindicate the right to operate a business in a free market.
90
  
In the twentieth century, a victory against overt state racial segregation laws, 
previously hampered by the State Action Doctrine from the Civil Rights Cases, was 
achieved in Buchanan v. Warley.
91
 Buchanan involved an ordinance seeking to 
maintain segregation of Louisville’s neighborhoods. The ordinance was challenged 
by a white resident, whose attempt to sell his property was frustrated by a black 
man, to whom he was to sell the property, refusing to perform the contract because 
the ordinance forbade him from living in the home he was to purchase.
92
 The 
Court, in sound Blackstonian logic,
93
 found that the ordinance interfered “with the 
civil right of a white man to dispose of his property,”
94
 and thus was an 
unconstitutional interference with property rights guaranteed in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
95
 By bringing the Court’s attention to the economic interference 
attendant to segregation laws, the NAACP’s lawyers were able to neutralize a 
powerful tool of racial oppression by speaking the Court’s liberal language.
96
 
While Buchanan massaged the Court’s liberal economic fetish with freedom of 
contract language to reach public discrimination, Shelley v. Kraemer
97
 relied on the 
Equal Protection Clause to make the Court—and thus the State—complicit in 
private discrimination.
98
 Thurgood Marshall circumvented the Civil Rights Cases’ 
antipathy to rooting out private acts of discrimination in real estate by noting that, 
while the Constitution may not have forbidden inserting racially restrictive 
covenants into private property contracts, enforcing those contracts, should a party 
not abide by the discriminatory language, would require State actors.
99
 In both 
Buchanan and Shelley, major weapons of discrimination used to ghettoize blacks 
were dismantled by summoning the Fourteenth Amendment in service of ridding 
the real estate market of State interference and ensuring that the rights to contract 
and freely alienate one’s property were left unmolested.
100
 
While Shelley was a liberal victory for the free market that allowed a measure 
of racial equality in through the back door, it did not overrule the Civil Rights 
Cases.
101
 The Court thus found itself stuck between vindicating two possibly 
 ________________________  
 89. Id. at 363–64, 373–74. There were 280 permits to operate a dry cleaning business in a wood based 
structure (as opposed to the safer brick or stone structures) requested: the 200 denied were all requested by 
Chinese, the eighty granted were all requested by Caucasians (although some sources indicate that one Caucasian 
was denied a permit to operate in a wooden structure). 
 90. Id. at 374. 
 91. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See GLENDON, supra note 31 (noting Glendon’s discussion of Blackstone’s commentaries). 
 94. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 81. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., id.  
 97. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 98. Id. at 20–21 (1948). 
 99. Id. at 13. 
 100. See Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 291 (1956) (no State action found in judicial enforcement of 
a private contract). 
 101. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
10
Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/3
Fall 2013 E Pluribus Unum: Liberalism's March 59 
 
conflicting pillars of liberalism: the State should not regulate individual behavior, 
but nor should it allow inefficiencies—illiberal animosities in this case—to 
interfere with the market either.
102
 The Court was forced to reconcile this tension—
and in the process demonstrate its commitment to liberalism over illiberal 
animosities—in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.
103
 In order to reach 
private discrimination, Justice Clark’s “murky opinion”
104
 overcame the State 
Action Doctrine by tying a discriminating restaurant to the State through its lease 
of State property.
105
 Evans v. Newton
106
 stretched even further to connect the State 
to private illiberal actors through the Public Function Doctrine that deemed private 
citizens public actors if they performed duties traditionally assumed by public 
officials.
107
 In a similar “novel and potentially far-reaching”
108
 entanglement of 
public and private, Reitman v. Mulkey
109
 was able to construe public authorization 
or encouragement of racial discrimination as State action.
110
 
In addition to State support of private discrimination, Thurgood Marshall, 
Charles Hamilton Houston, and other NAACP lawyers similarly attacked the 
apparatus of racial segregation in education one buttress at a time in Gaines v. 
Canada,
111
 Sweatt v. Painter,
112
 Mclaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education,
113
 through the language of liberalism before Plessy v. Ferguson,
114
 and 
the collapse of “separate but equal” in Brown v. Board of Education.
115
 Brown is 
popularly viewed as an endorsement of racial equality, but, as Michael Klarman 
writes, Justice Warren’s opinion appears careful not to state a racial classification 
rule.
116
 Instead, Justice Warren elevates education to a fundamental right.
117
 His 
discussion of Brown starts by announcing the Court’s intention of considering 
“public education in the light of its full development and its present place in 
American life”
118
 because “[o]nly in this way can it be determined if segregation in 
public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.”
119
 
Given that education is compulsory and “the foundation of good citizenship,” the 
 ________________________  
 102. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11, 17. See also Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13. 
 103. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
 104. Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 271 
(1991) (citing Philip B. Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629, 650 (1970)). 
 105. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723–24, 726. 
 106. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
 107. Id. at 302. 
 108. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 at 375–76, 380–81 (Nov. 21, 1966) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 
1392, case file no. 483) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 109. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
 110. Id. at 375–76, 380–81. 
 111. 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (discussing the right to attend an in-state law school). 
 112. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (discussing the right to attend a “substantively equal” law school). 
 113. 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (discussing the right to attend graduate school, decided on the same day as 
Gaines). 
 114. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 115. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 116. Klarman, supra note 104, at 246–47. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. 
 119. Id. at 493. 
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State must make it available on equal terms when it undertakes to provide it.
120
 
Justice Warren’s language, while at first blush seemingly indicative of egalitarian 
concerns, does not stray too far from liberalism’s mandates.
121
 Brown did not 
promise equal schools or equal education for white and black students.
122
 It instead 
prohibited States from treating students differently based on race after it mandated 
that the public avail itself to the right that the State was providing.
123
 
The Court reiterated its concern for “equal educational opportunities”
124
 in its 
discussion of the Sweatt and McLaurin right to education cases.
125
 Justice Warren’s 
Brown opinion did contain language that could be construed as egalitarian.
126
 He 
noted a concern for feelings of inferiority attendant to racial segregation; although 
even this issue was quickly linked back to how separation affects opportunity.
127
 
Brown was a delicately crafted nine-to-zero decision that sewed together Northern, 
Southern, New Deal, and post-New Deal justices, under the guidance of a new 
Chief Justice sympathetic to measures of racial justice.
128
 It did so through the 
liberal language of rights and equal opportunity.
129
 
Professor Klarman also argues that the Court first fully embraced a racial 
classification rule in McLaughlin v. Florida.
130
 McLaughlin struck down a Florida 
law that criminalized cohabitation between unmarried interracial couples.
131
 The 
holding was applied three years later to invalidate the country’s thirteen remaining 
anti-miscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia.
132
 McLaughlin and Loving, similar 
to Brown, both demonstrate the apex of the Court’s concern with equality and its 
employment of egalitarian language.
133
 The two racial classification rulings, also 
like Brown, however, are replete, arguably dispositively so, with liberal rights 
language.
134
 While Brown might not pass muster without elevating education—at 
most “equal opportunity to an education”—to a fundamental right, McLaughlin and 
Loving are better understood as rulings not affirming the equality of whites and 
blacks, but as defenses of the right to property and the right to marry.
135
 
McLaughlin specifically dealt with the right to cohabitate.
136
 In more general 
 ________________________  
 120. Id. 
 121. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483. 
 122. 347 U.S. 483. Nor did the Court accept the invitation to mandate equal schools. San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 123. 347 U.S. at 495–96. 
 124. Id. at 493. 
 125. Id. at 493–94. 
 126. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483.  
 127. Id. at 493–94. 
 128. Chief Justice Fred Vinson died in September of 1953 after Brown’s first argument, leaving newly-
appointed Earl Warren to be steward of the Court’s seminal desegregation case. See Stephen Ellmann, The Rule of 
Law and the Achievement of Unanimity in Brown, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741 (2004). 
 129. Id. 
 130. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 131. Id. 
 132. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 133. See Klarman, supra note 104, at 254–58.   
 134. Id. at 255–57. 
 135. Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who We Want to Be with 
the “Equalerty” of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 220, 263 (2010). 
 136. See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
12
Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/3
Fall 2013 E Pluribus Unum: Liberalism's March 61 
 
classical liberal terms, McLaughlin is a vindication of the castle doctrine.
137
 A 
man’s home is his castle.
138
 While Buchanan celebrated free alienation of 
property,
139
 McLaughlin addressed absolute enjoyment of freehold.
140
 Combined 
with the privacy concept conjured out of property by Warren and Brandeis years 
earlier that would expressly manifest to protect other behavior in the bedroom a 
year later in Griswold v. Connecticut,
141
 the State’s illiberal racial animosities were 
overcome. Loving relied on both the Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process 
Clauses.
142
 Justice Warren wrote about the impermissible use of race to 
discriminate.
143
 But in both the equal protection and substantive due process 
sections of the opinion, the fundamental right to marry, the right of an individual to 
choose, free from a State’s illiberal racial restrictions, was emphasized as opposed 
to the equality between white and black citizens.
144
 
While cases like Brown and Loving undoubtedly provided measures of 
equality, the most persuasive evidence of Justice Warren’s short-lived “egalitarian 
revolution”
145
 is not in its approach to racial equality but its brief stint addresses 
income inequality.
146
 The Court’s first “wealth discrimination” ruling came in 
Griffin v. Illinois in which a divided Court held that a “State-created right of appeal 
against criminal convictions could be conditioned upon production of a trial 
transcript only if indigent defendants were provided free ones.”
147
 Justice Black’s 
plurality opinion announced that, “[t]here can be no justice where the kind of trial a 
man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”
148
 Klarman notes that Griffin is 
striking because not only does the Court show an unprecedented concern for 
poverty, but also its egalitarian language goes beyond just prohibiting a State from 
proactively discriminating on the basis of income to requiring it to accommodate 
someone based on a lack of wealth.
149
 The Court’s concern for the indigent 
continued in the landmark Gideon v. Wainwright
150
 ruling guaranteeing counsel for 




The Warren Court’s concern for the poor was extended beyond a criminal 
rights context in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.
152
 Harper invalidated 
 ________________________  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917). 
 140. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 141. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), (discussed infra pp. 26–31). 
 142. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 7–9. 
 145. Klarman, supra note 104, at 257. 
 146. Racial justice and solicitude for the poor are related and overlap given the relationship between racial 
hierarchy and income inequality but the two classes are also separate and distinct. See Shuler, supra note 135, at 
238 (quoting Professor Hutchinson on the Court’s equality doctrine). 
 147. Klarman, supra note 104, at 265 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). 
 148. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19. 
 149. Klarman, supra note 104, at 266. 
 150. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Harper v. Va. State Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). 
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a State poll tax with the Equal Protection Clause, reasoning that “wealth, like race, 
creed, color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the 
electoral process.”
153
 Boddie v. Connecticut
154
 followed Harper’s rationale, but 
also simultaneously tried to limit just how far the Court’s concern for the poor 
could be extended.
155
 While divorce filing fees applied to the indigent were struck 
down, Justice Harlan attempted to confine the Court’s solicitude for the poor to 
areas in which the State exercised a monopoly (such as the court system or 
education as discussed in Brown above).
156
  
While Griffin and its progeny no doubt speak to egalitarian concerns and 
arguably represent the height of the Supreme Court’s concern for economic 
equality,
157
 Klarman rightly, but incompletely, sets this concern within the context 
of individual rights.
158
 While Justices Warren and Black made explicit overtures to 
the equality of the poor, those platitudes were undergirded by liberal notions of 
constitutional rights of individuals, not the equality of the indigent as a group.
159
 
Much like how Brown found that the right to education could not be denied to an 
individual based on race, wealth discrimination was only addressed in Griffin 
because the State was threatening an individual’s Sixth Amendment right to trial 
and a Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
160
 The same is true for Gideon, 
Douglas, Harper, and Boddie. The indigents had no standing to bring a case before 
the Court because they were poor.
161
 They could not petition the Court for 
economic equality.
162
 They could only argue that the State could not infringe upon 
their individual rights to due process and voting because they were poor.
163
 
The Warren Court’s need to stretch the connection between private behavior 
and State action was somewhat relieved by the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act that expressly forbade the private discrimination that the Court had been trying 
to link to public accommodation.
164
 The Commerce Clause seems a better fit to 
champion the liberal causes of freedom to contract and an unregulated market in a 
national economy than a Reconstruction Amendment ostensibly concerned with 
black equality. The fact that the Warren Court tried to apply the Fourteenth 
Amendment to income inequality and circumvent the Civil Rights Cases’ strict 
State Action Doctrine to reach private acts of discrimination is highly suggestive of 
 ________________________  
 153. Klarman, supra note 104, at 266 (citing Harper, 383 U.S. at 668). 
 154. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). While Justice Warren left the Court in 1969, the Boddie ruling still reflects the 
Warren Court’s approach to the rights of the indigent. See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking 
down a Wisconsin statute prohibiting persons with non-custodial children from marrying without first obtaining a 
court order showing they were financially supporting children). 
 155. Klarman, supra note 104, at 266. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 269.   
 158. Id. at 265–69. 
 159. Id. at 263–65. 
 160. Id. at 265. 
 161. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 
Harper v. Va. State Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Klarman, supra note 104, at 273–79. 
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 It bears repeating, however, that these concerns had to 
arrive at the Court on the backs of individual constitutional rights.
166
 Moreover, 
egalitarian language usually, if not always, was accompanied by the liberal 
language of individual rights.
167
 Nevertheless, cases such as Jones v. Alfred Mayer 
Co.
168
 illustrating the “Justices’ willingness to compromise traditional legal canons 
in their apparent quest to eradicate private racial discrimination” demonstrate a 
sincere concern for equality.
169
 Or, in the case of Justice Harlan, perhaps his 
begrudging assent to the Court’s constitutional jiu jitsu in order to reach the “right” 
result stemmed more from a sense of necessity in the wake of Martin Luther King’s 
assassination with “a good deal of Washington on fire as a result of race riots.”
170
 
However, as discussion of explicit illiberal animosities began to recede in the 
Court’s decisions, so too did an espousal of egalitarian concern, leaving a newly 
resurgent neo-liberalism to reign mostly unimpeded at the Court. While the Warren 
Court had stretched the State Action Doctrine to its breaking point, it quickly 
snapped back, as the Burger Court assembled.
171
 
2.   Two Feathers of the Same Liberal Bird 
Substantive due process has been equal protection’s Fourteenth Amendment 
companion in many civil rights decisions.
172
 The differences between the two 
clauses, often thought to rest on a liberty versus equality distinction, are muddled, 
spawning a cottage industry of scholarship attempting to “untangle the strands of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”
173
 The distinctions, while promising academically 
and still often promoted jurisprudentially, are arguably moot when viewing the 
clauses as two feathers of the same liberal bird. Regardless of whether equal 
protection, or substantive due process, or both were invoked, successful civil rights 
decisions, consciously, or not, demonstrate liberalism’s influence on the 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, and employ the language and logic of 
liberalism to overcome illiberal State interference.
174
 
Substantive due process’s first judicial incarnation in the United States was as 
an explicit liberal tool used to strike down State economic regulations “in the name 
of liberty of contract and vested property rights.”
175
 The maiden appearance of 
 ________________________  
 165. See generally Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 166. See generally id. (While Justices Warren and Black made explicit overtures to the equality of the poor, 
those platitudes were undergirded by liberal notions of constitutional rights of individuals, not the equality of the 
indigent as a group.)  
 167. See generally id.  
 168. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 169. Klarman, supra note 104, at 278. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (companion cases to Meyer v. Nebraska, discussed infra 
pp. 25–26). 
 173. Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See generally Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941 (1990) (citing 
Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” of Contract Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 
(1926)), (discussing origins of substantive due process). 
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substantive due process in the Court’s jurisprudence as a ground in and of itself to 
strike down interfering State legislation after a century of allusions to what the 
doctrine might mean
176
 was likely found in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.
177
 The Court 
held that an individual citizen’s liberty to enter into a contract in furtherance of 
business invalidated a State law requiring insurance to be procured through a 
company that had complied with that particular State’s insurance laws, thus, 
creating an impermissible oligopoly for the State’s insurance companies.
178
 
Striking down economic regulation with the Substantive Due Process Clause 
reached its apex in the “Lochner era,” ushered in by the era’s seminal case of 
Lochner v. New York.
179
 
Lochner involved the State of New York’s prohibition of bakers working more 
than sixty hours in a week
180
. The Court struck the statute down as improperly 
interfering with an individual’s right to contract as part of the liberty protected by 
the Substantive Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
181
 The 
following decades saw substantive due process strike down economic legislation 
that the Court viewed as impermissible restraints on economic liberties.
182
 It also, 
most notably in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,
183
 hinted at substantive due 
process’s latent capability to address civil rights matters through liberalism’s 




The Lochner era of preserving laissez-faire economics through the notion of 
economic liberty in the Substantive Due Process Clause ended
185
 in the late 1930’s 
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 
186
 after the Court began to accede to President 
Roosevelt’s New Deal.
187
 Howard Gillman writes, that at the time, Lochner itself 
was not even considered important enough to expressly overrule.
188
 The fallout was 
substantial, however, Lochner-type reasoning, (i.e. illegitimate judicial policy 
making) would be pilloried. Gillman further provides that: 
 ________________________  
 176. See Brown, supra note 52, at 90. 
 177. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
 178. See id. at 590–93. 
 179. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. 578.  
 182. See Klarman, supra note 104, at 221–22.   
 183. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (applying Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 184. David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253, 
1261–70 (2005), citing Buchanan, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (adopting Justice Harlan’s Berea College dissent to 
recognized liberty interests cannot be defeated by discriminatory rationales offered by State). 
 185. Lochner’s fall was presaged by Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) when the Court upheld state 
economic legislation instead of preserving any nebulous idea of economic liberty, although it returned a few years 
later to make its final curtain call in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (striking down 
minimum wage laws for women). See Daniel O. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. 
L.J. 215, 217 (1987). 
 186. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage laws for women, overruling Morehead). 
 187. See generally Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down The 
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down The 
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935). 
 188. Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV. 859 (2005). 
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Lochner was transformed into the normative Lochner—that is, into 
the symbol of judges usurping legislative authority by basing 
decisions on policy preferences rather than law. Lochner became 
that symbol, not because the case itself was an especially good 
example of that vice, but because [Justice] Holmes’ aphoristic 
dissent proved politically convenient for later generations of 
lawyers and judges. New Dealers, intent on de-legitimizing the 
constitutional vision of early twentieth century judicial 
conservatives found cover under [Justice] Holmes’ dissent. 
Conservatives later resurrected the ghost of Lochner as a way of 
assaulting the civil liberties opinions of the Warren and Burger 
Courts. Lochner had finally become Lochernized.
189
  
Gillman’s assessment of the specific political and legal fallout after the 
“Lochnerization” of Lochner remains informative; however, it bears emphasizing 
that while judicial conservatives lost substantive due process as an economic 
weapon against regulation in the midst of a depression, the Clause would resurface 
shortly thereafter to continue to fight infringements on individual liberty.
190
 A 
scarcely regulated economy in the country’s worst economic moment may have 
been temporarily abandoned, but substantive due process in the service of 
liberalism, albeit in a slightly different form, had not. Lochner was not overruled 
because it was inappropriate for the Court to safeguard liberty or liberalism, but 
because the valid public welfare purpose—laissez-faire economics in the midst of a 
crippling depression—had changed.
191
 During the Depression, liberty could not be 
protected adequately without regulation, and “the absence of governmental 
interference into the economic affairs of the working public was harmful to the 
public good—an irony in which the application of the principle undermines the 
value embodied in the principle itself.”
192
 
After its initial use in the area of economic legislation by conservatives to 
preserve the laissez-faire approach, but before the sullying of the Lochner name, 
the substantive due process doctrine was extended beyond economic rights to civil 
rights as well as liberalism’s preference for individual autonomy, and self-
determination overcame competing illiberal animosities.
193
 Meyer v. Nebraska
194
 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters
195
 are two cases applying the Substantive Due 
Process Clause to protect decisions regarding the upbringing and education of 
 ________________________  
 189. Id. at 861. 
 190. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).  
 191. Gillman, supra note 188, at 860–62. 
 192. Rebecca L. Brown, The Fragmented Liberty Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 83–84 (1999) (citing 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 585 (2d ed. 1988). 
 193. Lupu, supra note 173, at 986–88.   
 194. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 195. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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 struck down a World War I-era Nebraska law that prohibited 
schools that taught children in German,
198
 and Pierce similarly invalidated an 
Oregon law precluding private education.
199
 The statutes in both instances were 
facially neutral; however, Germans had been targeted with the statute in Meyer 
after the war ended,
200
 while Catholic schools were the aim of the law in Pierce.
201
 
Kenneth Karst points out that both laws were examples of the Temperance 
Movement to maintain the superior status of Anglo-Protestants over recent Irish 
and German Catholic immigrants.
202
 Both cases discussed and came to be 
understood as withdrawing important decisions with regard to one’s children from 
the State in favor of parents.
203
 While Meyer and Pierce may have resulted in better 
treatment of Germans, Irish, and Catholics, the decisions were made pursuant to 
liberal notions of individual rights.
204
 The Court made no mention of the equality of 
new immigrants, and an egalitarian strategy on behalf of Meyer and Pierce 
emphasizing the equality of foreign Catholics in a still mostly Protestant United 
States would likely not have had the same traction and success that framing their 
cases in the language of American liberalism had.
205
  
3.    Privacy as Property 
Most scholars mark Griswold v. Connecticut
206
 as the beginning of the United 
States Supreme Court’s resuscitation of the Substantive Due Process Clause.
207
 
Griswold’s indispensable antecedent, however, came four years earlier in Poe v. 
Ullman.
208
 Poe did not hold binding authority over Griswold because Poe’s merits 
were never addressed by the majority opinion, but the dissents of Justice Douglas, 
and in particular Justice Harlan, laid the foundation for the future use of substantive 
due process to secure individual rights—initially under privacy rhetoric and later 
through the language of individual rights.
209
 The dissents interwove—at times 
 ________________________  
 196. Both Meyer and Pierce also analyzed the liberty involved through the prism of the teacher’s right to 
teach but both cases would later be seen as ensuring parental liberty in determining the upbringing of their 
children. 
 197. Bartels v. Iowa, Bohning v. Ohio, and Pohl v. Ohio, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) were the companion cases 
decided with Meyer. 
 198. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401–03.  
 199. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532–34. 
 200. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396–97. 
 201. Karst, supra note 48, at 109–11. 
 202. Id. at 110–12. 
 203. The Court also invalidated a law from Hawaii similar to the one struck down in Meyer in 1927. Hawaii 
had yet to be granted statehood and therefore the law’s prohibition of the teaching of certain foreign languages was 
found to be unconstitutional, pursuant to the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment. See Farrington v. 
Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (applying Meyer/Pierce reasoning to the federal government through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to strike down a law designed to shut down Japanese language schools). 
See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (overturning a state custody law in favor of parents’ discretion). 
 204. Karst, supra note 48, at 111. 
 205. See generally id. (discussing the strategies employed in the Meyer/Pierce cases in context of nativism 
versus substantive due process). 
 206. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 207. See e.g. Park, supra note 70, at 850. 
 208. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 209. Poe, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J. concurring). 
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convoluted, Justice Douglas’ especially—privacy principles from the first eight 
amendments, most importantly the privacy concepts found in the Third and Fourth 
Amendments, with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty and 
autonomy.
210
 In addition to that relationship, however, Justice Harlan confirmed 
that the guarantee of liberty as a safeguard of the most intimate and profound 
decisions an individual can make with regard to her personal life against State 
intrusion could be found in the Fourteenth Amendment
211
 as a separate and distinct 
concept from the fundamental rights expressly delineated in the first eight 
amendments.  
What offended Justice Douglas in Poe most was the practical requisite in 
enforcing such a law.
212
 He warned that we could “reach the point where search 
warrants issued and officers appeared in bedrooms to find out what went on.”
213
 
Making use of contraception a crime meant the intolerable to Justice Douglas—
”the State ha[d] entered the innermost sanctum of the home.”
214
 Such actions by the 
State constituted “an invasion of the privacy that is implicit in a free society,”
215
 as 
well as Warren and Brandeis’ property concept now on the verge of being 
operationalized in constitutional civil rights. 
Justice Harlan dissented separately, yet similarly and much more extensively, 
to emphasize the gravity of the matter and further elucidate Justice Douglas’ 
substantive due process argument.
216
 His opinion would profoundly influence and 
serve as the basis for the future of the Court’s application of substantive due 
process.
217
 He, too, wrote that the Connecticut legislation violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment as an invasion of the most “intimate concerns of an individual’s 
personal life” despite there being “no explicit language [in] the Constitution” 
announcing it as such.
218
 Nevertheless, Justice Harlan agreed with Justice Douglas 
that substantive due process was a broad, flexible concept that protected 
individuals from otherwise democratic legislation enacted by the State that 
deprived them of life, liberty, or property no matter the procedural fairness 
involved.
219
 Procedural due process, with its roots in the Magna Carta’s per legem 
terrae, “had in the [United States] become bulwarks also against arbitrary 
legislation,” thus, establishing substantive due process.
220
 
Justice Harlan noted that “long before the adoption of [the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the] concepts which are considered to embrace [the] rights which are 
fundamental, which belong to the citizens of all free governments”
221
 were of 
primary concern, a sentiment paralleling Rogers Smith’s account of the visions of 
 ________________________  
 210. 367 U.S. 497. 
 211. Id. at 539–50. 
 212. See id. at 509–22 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. at 520. 
 214. Id. at 521. 
 215. Id. at 520–21. 
 216. Shuler, supra note 135, at 249–56 (2010). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 251 (citing Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe, 367 U.S. at 539). 
 219. Poe, 367 U.S. at 541. 
 220. Id. at 541 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)). 
 221. Id. at 541 (citing Calder, Fletcher, and Corfield). 
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both Federalists and Anti-Federalists.
222
 Further, Justice Harlan argued that the 
Court had a history of stating that the Fourteenth Amendment did not merely serve 
to enforce the enumerated rights in the first eight amendments which were directed 
by the Federal Government against the states.
223
 Aside from making those 
expressly articulated rights applicable against the states, an extra component 
consisting of liberty, however ambiguously expressed, was enshrined.
224
 This 
ambiguity was bereft of formula or code to discern it in a precise fashion, 
according to Justice Harlan.
225
 “[T]he best that could be said [was] that through 
[the] Court’s decisions it represented the balance which [the United States] built 
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual.”
226
  
This concept of liberty, as guaranteed vis-à-vis substantive due process, is 
derived from “the imperative character of [c]onstitutional provisions,” character 
that “must be discerned from a particular provision’s larger context
227
 . . . not of 
words, but of history and purposes.”
228
 Liberty was not “a series of isolated points 
pricked out,” but instead was to be an inexhaustible “rational continuum” that 
protected individuals from “arbitrary impositions” and “purposeless restraints.”
229
 
Justice Harlan was certain that the Connecticut statute deprived the plaintiffs of 
substantial liberty “in carrying on the most intimate of all personal relationships, 
and that it [did] so arbitrarily and without any rational, justifying purpose.”
230
 
Moreover, the legislation and its enforcement offended the relationship an 
individual had with property and his free enjoyment thereof.
231
 
The Poe dissents became law four years later in Griswold v. Connecticut.
232
 
Justice Douglas gleaned privacy principles, or “emanations” forming a penumbra 
of protection around an individual, from the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth 
Amendments to strike down the Connecticut contraception law.
233
 He opted for an 
approach, grounded in privacy, derived from the Bill of Rights in consultation with 
 ________________________  
 222. See discussion supra p. 5. 
 223. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); Hurtado v. 
Cal., 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); In re Kimmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Twining 
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
 224. Poe, 367 U.S. at 516. 
 225. Id. at 542. 
 226. Id. at 539. 
 227. See Laurence H. Tribe, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV 1057, 1068–
69 (1990) (expounding on Justice Harlan’s Poe opinion about “infer[ring] unifying principles at a higher level of 
abstraction, focusing at times upon rights instrumentally required if one is to enjoy those specified, and a times 
upon rights logically presupposed if those specified are to make sense.”). 
 228. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542–43. See also Tribe, supra note 227, at 1069 (discussing examples of freedom of 
speech and freedom of religion only making sense if connected by the broader, underlying principles of freedom 
of thought and conscience). 
 229. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543. The continuum is an extension of previous cases that collaboratively create a 
theme of preserving certain areas of liberty from State intrusion. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); 
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425 (1902); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 
(1934); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). It 
further makes sense if “abstracted from the particular spheres of life they protect: free speech is an empty freedom 
if not possessed by a free mind.” Tribe, supra note 227, at 1069.  
 230. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543. 
 231. Shuler, supra note 135, at 252. 
 232. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 233. Shuler, supra note 135, at 256–60. 
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Justices still wary of Lochner’s specter,
234
 while Justice Harlan reiterated his 
substantive due process dissent from Poe.
235
 While, Justice Douglas’ emanations 
and penumbras concept carried the majority in Griswold, protections for individual 
liberty and privacy, including Griswold itself, would later be subsumed under 
substantive due process precedents
236
 as opposed to Justice Douglas’ short-lived 
metaphor. 
Lest Griswold be considered an endorsement of marital privacy, Warren and 
Brandeis’ newly minted general principle of privacy as property was extended to 
singles in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
237
 and minors in Carey v. Population Services 
International.
238
 Justice Brennan emphasized the right of an individual to be free 
from State intrusion in both cases, and upheld “certain areas or zones of privacy” 
where individuals had an “interest in independence.”
239
 These zones of privacy, 
“pulled from the hat of property”
240
 by Warren and Brandeis decades earlier to 
cordon off an individual’s thoughts, beliefs, and intellectual property, were 
extended by the Court out of the bedroom to not just birth control, but also whether 
to give birth.
241
 Roe v. Wade
242
 was decided on substantive due process grounds 
instead of Justice Douglas’ penumbras and emanations doctrine. While Justice 
Douglas’ inartful
243
 attempt to avoid Lochner’s substantive due process taint with 
metaphorical allusions to the Bill of Rights was quickly abandoned, Griswold and 
its progeny still live on as precedential embodiments of the Warren-Brandeis 
privacy as property construct.
244
 The language has changed from “privacy” to 
liberalism’s preferred “liberty,” and the constitutional clause has shifted back to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause after a brief stay in the 
penumbras of the Bill of Rights.
245
 But while the particular terms and clause briefly 
varied, the principle and theory being vindicated did not: liberalism’s protection of 
individual rights and property from State intrusion and interference.
246
 
 ________________________  
 234. This right to privacy approach is thought to have come at Justice Brennan’s suggestion and was hoped 
to gain favor with Justice Black, a staunch believer since 1947 in the incorporation of the first eight amendments 
of the Bill of Rights against the states. See Karst, supra note 48, at 124. Justice Black nevertheless dissented in 
Griswold at length against what he saw as impermissible “Lochner” type decision making. Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 514–27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).  
 235. Griswold 381 U.S. at 499–502 (Harlan, J., concurring).   
 236. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–65 (2003). 
 237. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 238. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 239. Id. 
 240. See GLENDON, supra note 31, at 51. 
 241. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas criminal abortion statutes prohibiting 
abortions were found unconstitutional).  
 242. 410 U.S. 113. 
 243. With all apologies to William Safire. William Safire, On Language: Inartful, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 
20, 2008, at MM14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/magazine/20wwln-safire-t.html?_r=0. 
 244. See GLENDON, supra note 31, at 51. 
 245. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
 246. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discussing the right of an individual to be 
free from State intrusion in the bedroom), Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (discussing the right of an individual to be free from 
State intrusion in reproductive matters.) 
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PART II:  NEO-LIBERALISM 
A.   Arrested Development: Neo-Liberalism’s Equal Protection of 
Ascription 
1.   Reports of the State’s Demise Have Not Been Greatly Exaggerated 
Political scientists, seeking to dispel the notion that the United States is 
“stateless,” have produced ample scholarship in the last thirty years seeking to 
“bring the state back in.”
247
 While it is persuasive that American statelessness 
relative to European democracies is exaggerated given the depth and scope of the 
American regulatory machine, a resurgent American neo-liberalism starting in the 
1970s took the State out of the egalitarian business that it had waded into during 
the Warren Court.
248
 A retreat from a proactive approach to equality is perhaps 




Michael Klarman argues that the Warren Court’s willingness to circumvent the 
State Action Doctrine to reach arguably private discrimination augurs in favor of 
conjecture that it also would have addressed segregation as a result of de facto 
discrimination in addition to de jure mandates.
250
 Klarman points to Green v. 
County School Board
251
 in addition to other evidence
252
 to contend that the Warren 
Court “would have interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to require actual racial 
integration.”
253
 Klarman is a convincing scholar, but we are only left with what did 
happen, namely the Burger Court’s announcement in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,
254
 that the Equal Protection Clause would not be 
in the business of solving de facto segregation.
255
 The end of Johnson’s Great 
Society and a resurgent neo-liberalism under Nixon was soon reflected at the Court 
with the replacements of Justices Warren and Fortas with Justices Warren Burger 
and Harry Blackmun.
256
 Much has been written about the Burger Court’s 
 ________________________  
 247. See generally PETER B. EVANS, DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER & THEDA SKOCPOL, BRINGING THE STATE 
BACK IN (1985) (political scientists explaining the State’s role in social change); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, 
BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 
(1982) (tracking the expansion of national regulatory powers). 
 248. See Klarman, supra note 104, at 283. 
 249. Id. at 276. 
 250. Id. at 279–80. 
 251. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 252. “[L]ower court resolutions of the de facto segregation issue, and internal evidence from the first 
northern school desegregation case.” Klarman, supra note 104, at 280 (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 
189 (1973)). 
 253. Id. at 281.  
 254. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Charles R. Lawrence III, 
Segregation Misunderstood: The Milliken Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15 (1977); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. 
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).  
 255. See Klarman, supra note 104, at 299–303. 
 256. Powell and Rehnquist arrived a short time after to make up the Burger Court. See William H. 
Rehnquist, 1986–2005, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-
of-the-court/chief-justices/william-rehnquist-1986-2005/ (last visited November 15, 2013); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
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 This thesis appears to be largely true, particularly if the 
Burger Court is viewed in the larger context of the history of liberalism at the 
Court as opposed to the more conventional understanding that Justice Burger 
largely failed to roll back or even halt the Warren Court’s expansion of civil 
liberties.
258
 What is remarkable is not that a conservative counterrevolution to 
combat the Warren Court’s egalitarian revolution is thought to have failed, but that 
the idea that a counterrevolution was needed even existed.
259
 
One specific difference between the Warren and Burger Courts, however, was 





 was the first decision in thirty-five years that rejected an Equal 
Protection Clause challenge for failing to implicate the State in purposeful racial 
discrimination.
262
 The Court continued to deny challenges to racial discrimination 
for lack of direct State involvement in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
263
 as well as 
enforcing the doctrine against challenges to racial discrimination based in other 
constitutional clauses.
264
 The Burger Court quickly and decisively took the State 
out of ostensibly private behavior.
265
 It also stepped in to thwart State attempts at 
confronting the hierarchies that the states themselves had constructed in the past.
266
 
As the Civil Rights movement gained more traction and public sympathies 
turned against overt racial discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause continued to 
be limited but effective at removing explicit illiberal animosities.
267
 To be useful 
going forward, equal protection would not be needed so much to confront the 
fading existence of illiberal legislation that constructed hierarchies, but instead 
would have to be able to ferret out “sophisticated doctrines of racial inequality 
[that] were dominant in American public opinion”
268
 in order to dismantle them. 
Liberalism alone, now largely free from competing ideologies, became not the tool 




1972–1987, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-
court/associate-justices/lewis-powell-jr-1972-1987/ (last visited November 15, 2013). 
 257. Klarman, supra note 104, at 283 (citing RICHARD Y. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
COUNTERREVOLUTION? 331– 338 (1977); A.E. Dick Howard, Burger Court in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 177 (LEONARD W. LEVY ET. AL EDS., (1989); William F. Swindler, The Burger Court, 1969–1979: 
Continuity and Contrast 28 KAN. L. REV. (1979)). 
 258. See Klarman, supra note 104, at 283. 
 259. Id.  
 260. Id. at 291–92.  
 261. 396 U.S. 435 (1970). 
 262. Klarman, supra note 104, at 292. 
 263. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
 264. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (Due Process). 
 265. See Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 177. 
 266. See generally id. (a state regulatory scheme enforced by the state liquor board did not sufficiently 
implicate the state in the discriminatory guest policies of a club). 
 267. See Klarman, supra note 104, at 293–94. 
 268. Smith, supra note 1, at 555. 
 269. See generally Klarman, supra note 104 (a limited history of modern equal protection, highlighting 
important conceptual shifts that occurred). 
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2.   Equal Protection as Entrenchment: Intent Over Impact 
The Burger Court’s doctrinal announcement in Washington v. Davis
270
 
delivered anything but the tool to dismantle hierarchies.
271
 Davis involved a test 
given by the District of Columbia to prospective police officers that ended up 
disqualifying four times as many black applicants as their white counterparts. 
Justice White found that tests that resulted in a disparate impact were not 
unconstitutional, even if the tests bore a tenuous relationship with the ability to 
perform the job in question, so long as the test administered was not given in 
pursuance of a racial animus.
272
 While the animus may not have been as overt as 
Henry Cabot Lodge’s literacy tests in 1896 that were ostensibly only concerned 
with intellectual merit, but worked to exclude “the Italians, Russians, Poles, 
Hungarians, Greeks, and Asiatics, thereby preserving the quality of our race and 
citizenship,”
273
 the District of Columbia’s test was similarly proffered as a way to 
ensure strong communication skills in the police ranks.
274
 Lodge’s design in 1896 
barely obscured its animating illiberal purpose.
275
 While illiberal motivations 
cannot be discounted in the Davis case, the opinion’s language is a testament to 
liberalism, championing equal opportunity over equal results, de-regulation of the 
job market and the free market’s ability to pick the best option.
276
 Lodge’s literacy 
test and D.C.’s communication skills exam may have intended different things, but 
the effect of illiberal tendencies in 1896, and those that failed in 1976 to reckon 
with them, were largely the same.
277
 
In Rogers Smith’s metaphor, although Civil Rights campaigners, some Johnson 
Administration legislation, and a few Supreme Court decisions “work[ed] to erode 
[the steep] mountains [of hierarchy] over time, broadening the valley, many of the 
 ________________________  
 270. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 271. Davis’ precursors came five years earlier and two years after Justice Warren left the Court in Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), when the Court limited its Equal Protection inquiries to 
de jure segregation instead of persistent de facto disparities. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).  
 272. Davis stands in stark contrast to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a Title VII case 
invalidating employer-administered tests without any “business necessity” that disproportionately excluded black 
workers from promotions. In his opinion in Davis, Justice White expressly declines to adopt the “more rigorous 
standard” announced in Griggs. Both Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment were ostensibly passed in response 
to racial hierarchy, yet Justice White was “not disposed to adopt” the more probing—and more egalitarian—
judicial standard that contemplated how arguably neutral legislation in the present maintains the invidious laws of 
the past. The Court’s convoluted distinctions between the two standards used for cases arising from the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause continued throughout the 1970s in cases such as Pasadena v. 
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), and Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). The Roberts Court’s 
decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), in which the Court ruled that the Title VII rights of nineteen 
whites and one Hispanic were violated when New Haven threw out tests that disqualified every black employee 
for a promotion for fear of facing a Title VII lawsuit…from the black employees along with its decision in Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), and its revisit to Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 309 (2003), may finally clear up the confusion in favor of neo-liberalism’s preference of banning the use of 
race altogether. See also Richard Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 493 (2003), for an admirable attempt at clearing up the Supreme Court’s muddled distinctions between its 
Title VII and Equal Protection doctrines. 
 273. Smith, supra note 1, at 560. 
 274. Davis, 426 U.S. at 251.  
 275. Smith, supra note 1, at 560. 
 276. See generally Davis, 426 U.S. 229.  
 277. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–52 (1896); Davis, 426 U.S. at 250–52. 
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peaks prove[d] to be volcanic, frequently responding to seismic pressures with 
outbursts that harden[ed] into substantial peaks once again.”
278
 The Court’s 
announcement in Davis that the impact of a law or State practice, however racially 
disparate it may be is subordinate to its intent, was a volcanic reaction of neo-
liberalism by the Burger Court in the Nixon era against egalitarian notions 
espoused by the Warren Court.
279
 This shift would be continued by both Reagan’s 




The Court’s neo-liberal approach to its equal protection doctrine continued to 
contract and harden in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.
281
 
Arlington Heights concerned a suspect denial to rezone a residential property from 
single detached homes to multi-unit buildings that would have housed lower to 
middle income families in a predominately white Chicago suburb.
282
 Forty percent 
of the residents that would have been eligible to live in the multi-unit buildings 
were black, despite comprising only eighteen percent of the area’s population.
283
 
The Court relied on Davis to deny the Equal Protection Clause challenge,
284
 finding 
that State action disproportionately affecting a [racial] group was not enough 
absent an invidious intent or purpose.
285
 A disparate impact could be “an important 
starting point” to prove an Equal Protection Clause violation, but egalitarian 
notions were not enough in light of the [race] neutral reason of protecting the 
property values of the individuals already living in the area in single family 
residences,
286
 a familiar echo from Buchanan’s 1917 Blackstonian property rights 
ruling removing a segregation ordinance that interfered with “the civil right of a 
white man to dispose of his property.”
287
 
The Court further explicated its neo-liberal preference for intent over impact 
two years later in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.
288
 Justice 
Stewart explained that neutral laws with disparate impacts could only be 
invalidated if the impact “can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.”
289
 He 
acknowledged that unconstitutional purposes could have been at work in Davis and 
Arlington Heights against groups that had been historically discriminated against, 
 ________________________  
 278. Smith, supra note 1, at 555. 
 279. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.  
 280. See Klarman, supra note 104, at 301; Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 
(2008). 
 281. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 282. Id. at 255–60. 
 283. Id. at 259. 
 284. The Court’s myopic constitutional approach in Davis that continued in Arlington Heights with its intent 
over impact doctrine was rejected on remand in favor of Griggs’ more searching statutory inquiry under the Fair 
Housing Act that invalidated the zoning denial for the constructive violation of civil rights in housing that it was. 
See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 285. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. 
 286. Id. at 266. 
 287. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917). 
 288. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). There are few better examples of how well the Davis doctrine of intent over 
impact preserves hierarchy considering that Massachusetts’ automatic preference for veterans all but inevitably 
excluded women because ninety-eight percent of veterans were male—a well preserved vestige of gender 
hierarchy initially defended by elite scholarship.  
 289. Id. at 272. 
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as was a possibility in Feeney.
290
 However, the Equal Protection Clause only 
guaranteed “equal laws, not equal results.”
291
 Justice Stewart maintained that mere 
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences was not enough to prove 
an equal protection violation.
292
 State actors were free to implement policies that 
they knew would burden historically disadvantaged groups so long as there was no 
“discriminatory purpose,” as opposed to an acceptable awareness of a disparate 
effect.
293
 This required that the state actor choose a policy “because of, not merely 
in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”
294
 Justice Stewart 
reasoned that “discriminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It either 
is a factor that has influenced the legislative choice or it is not.”
295
 While Justice 
Stewart acknowledged the possibility that ascriptive Americanism could be at work 
in the present,
296
 and that it had been at work in the past, he was unwilling or 
unable to bridge the past to the present.
297
 His demand for a discernible intent to 
discriminate not only failed to reckon with how unequal results reaffirm hierarchies 




3.   Disavowal as Ironic Innocence 
The Court’s fixation on the present intent betrays an unwillingness to consider 
Faulkner’s aphorism that “[t]he past is never dead, it’s not even the past.”
299
 It also 
evokes James Baldwin’s discussion of “ironic innocence.”
300
 Justices White, 
Powell,
301
 and Stewart have knowledge of the rigid racial ascription constructed 
that resulted in severe and pervasive inequality in employment and housing.
302
 A 
failure to acknowledge how that inequality persists in the present by disregarding 
the disparate impacts that manifest from ostensibly neutral state action in the 
present is to be complicit in the perpetuation of hierarchy.
303
  
 ________________________  
 290. Id. at 273–74. 
 291. Id. at 273. 
 292. Id.at 279.  
 293. See PRIMUS, supra note 32, at 230 (discussing liberalism’s neutrality toward outcomes and Michael 
Sandel’s criticism of the same). 
 294. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. 
 295. Id. at 277. 
 296. Feeney is an example of the possibility of different liberal goals conflicting: Justice Stewart prevented 
the State from addressing gender inequality continuing to operate in the present at the expense of allowing the free 
market to find the best applicant regardless of preference for veteran status. 
 297. See generally id.  
 298. See Smith, supra note 1, at 550 (“novel . . . legal systems reinforcing racial . . . inequalities might be 
rebuilt in America in the years ahead.”). Smith’s warning came in 1993, likely cognizant of the Burger Court’s 
reconstruction vis-à-vis its intent focus, and the Rehnquist Courts’ color-blind approach to proactive State 
measures to address past discrimination discussed herein. 
 299. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN, Act I, § 3 (1951). 
 300. SHULMAN, supra note 23, at 143.  
 301. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in Arlington Heights. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of 
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 302. See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. 229, Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252. 
 303. Id. 
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To Baldwin, the “nation [was] founded in genocide and slavery, whose ideals 
have never been practiced, or have been practiced only in exclusionary ways.”
304
 It 
is a “tragic story in which a nightmarish racial past imprisons everyone in barren 
repetition.”
305
 Baldwin addresses what the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence 
will not: a “hear no evil, see no evil” liberal approach to legislative intent in the 
present ignores “the persistence of racial domination among whites who celebrate 
democratic ideals, and the traps that white supremacy creates for those marked as 
black.”
306
 Participation in this barren repetition—to ignore how education, housing, 
and employment inequalities constructed through ascription in the past manifest in 
a drastically uneven playing field in the present, even under liberalism’s promise of 
uniform rules—works to continue to “destroy hundreds of thousands of lives and 
[the Court] do[es] not know it and do[es] not want to know it.”
307
 While ostensibly 
serving the liberal democratic ideal of equal laws, “it is not permissible that the 




The Court has full knowledge of the Black Codes, Jim Crow and the 
“inegalitarian scriptural readings, the scientific racism of the American school of 
ethnology, racial Darwinism and the romantic cult of Anglo-Saxonism in American 
historiography”
309
 that implemented the steep racial hierarchy operating in the 
United States.
310
 To be blind to how that hierarchy operates presently in education, 
employment, and all other facets of American life “is culpable because it is 
willful,” because what is at issue “is not a lack of knowledge but a ‘refusal to 




disavowal of domination is the innocence [Baldwin] denounces as 
criminal. Innocence means refusing not only to acknowledge the 
other but to acknowledge that [the Court] enacts this denial; it is 
disowning ([its] connection to) social facts [it] in some sense 




The Court’s ironic innocence in refusing to acknowledge how neo-liberalism’s 
promise of neutral intent in the present ratifies the invidious intent of the past is a 
Court that is “professing but violating democratic norms,”
313
 maintaining an 
ascriptive form of Americanism in its perfection of neo-liberalism that refuses to 
 ________________________  
 304. SHULMAN, supra note 23, at 142. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id.  
 307. Id. (citing BALDWIN, supra note 23, at 334). 
 308. SHULMAN, supra note 23, at 142. 
 309. Smith, supra note 1, at 549. 
 310. See Klarman, supra note 104, at 236. 
 311. SHULMAN, supra note 23, at 143. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
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acknowledge its complicity in the preservation of that ascription.
314
 Justice 
Stewart’s insistence that equal protection demands only “equal laws, not equal 
results,” serves to “deny the existence of white supremacy, which means denying 
the meaning of our history, the impact of [the Court’s intent over impact doctrine], 
the truth of [the Court and the ostensibly neutral legislators’] intentions, and the 
reality of those that we racialize.”
315
 The doctrine as expressed is an “affirmation of 
racial equality that nevertheless disavows the very historical conditions and 
contemporary practices that continue to reproduce racial stratification.”
316
 
4.   Equal Protection as Inversion: [Color] Blindness 
While the Court’s intent over impact doctrine entrenches and perpetuates 
ascription through indifference or willful ignorance, its neo-liberal color-blind 
companion in equal protection prohibits benign attempts by states to acknowledge 
and dismantle hierarchies.
317
 The post-Warren Courts have met state programs 
seeking to proactively address acute disparities in areas of life previously 
foreclosed to racial minorities with increasing opposition.
318
 They have done so by 
applying the doctrine of strict scrutiny—a heightened level of skepticism created to 
shield racial minorities historically discriminated against from hostile 
legislation
319
—to any law contemplating any race regardless of an ascriptive past. 
Under these constructions of the equal protection doctrine, intent is relevant, but 
the validity of the legislation varies depending on its relationship to racial 
minorities: if the law is indifferent to them and the resulting disparate impact they 
feel, it is nevertheless valid, whereas if the law seeks to aid them it is invalid.
320
 
Such is the inversion of a doctrine passed to protect and assist black Americans 




In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
322
 the Court struck down a policy of 
preferential protection against layoffs for minority teachers.
323
 In sustaining a white 
teacher’s equal protection attack on the Board of Education’s policy of preferring 
to retain minority teachers, Justice Powell emphasized that, “the level of scrutiny 
does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a 
group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.”
324
 He 
cited Equal Protection Clause cases invalidating the facially ascriptive anti-
 ________________________  
 314. See id.  
 315. SHULMAN, supra note 23, at 143. 
 316. Joseph Lowndes, The Past and Future of Race in the Tea Party Movement in STEEP 152, 160 
(Lawrence Rosenthal & Christine Trost eds., 2012) (citing LAWRIE BALFOUR, THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT 
SAID: JAMES BALDWIN AND THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001)). 
 317. See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 318. Id. 
 319. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
  320. Id. 
  321.         Id. at 466–67.  
 322. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 323. Id. at 283–84. 
 324. Id. at 273. 
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miscegenation laws of Virginia (struck down to preserve the right to marriage) in 
Loving and restrictive covenant laws of Missouri (struck down to protect the 
freedom to alienate property) in Shelley enacted to maintain rigid racial hierarchies 
as foundational precedents to strike down a state’s effort to maintain racial 
minorities in an educational workforce that had lacked such representation because 
of previously constructed ascription.
325
 
Justice Powell rejected addressing, if not atoning for, past societal 
discrimination as a sufficient basis to discriminate based on race, unless the 
specific entity using race in the present could be shown to have specifically created 
the disparity in the past, which it was now seeking to alleviate.
326
 While Justice 
Powell appeared to consider addressing egalitarian concerns, he declined his own 
invitation to racial justice in Wygant.
327
 Instead, in reasoning again reminiscent of 
Baldwinian disavowal, Justice Powell asserted that “there are numerous 
explanations for a disparity between the percentage of minority students and 
minority faculty, many of them unrelated to discrimination of any kind”
328
—a 
statement betraying his knowledge that there are discriminatory factors at play in 




The Court struck down another affirmative action plan seeking to award thirty 
percent of sub-contracting work for contracts between a city and general 
contractors to minority-owned companies three years later in City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co.
330
 Justice O’Connor took issue with states undertaking remedial 
measures to address past discrimination because the Fourteenth Amendment was 
meant to be a constraint on state power.
331
 Her opinion invalidated the City of 
Richmond’s plan because it could not demonstrate to a convincing degree that it 
had a history of discrimination against African Americans specifically within the 
construction industry.
332
 To consider past discrimination in general “would be to 




Justice O’Connor emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that 
equal protection shall not be denied to any person, that “preferential programs may 
only reinforce common stereotypes,” and thus, “the standard of review under [the] 
Equal Protection [Clause] is not dependent on the race of those burdened or 
benefitted.”
334
 Justice O’Connor further reasoned that “the mere recitation of a 
benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against 
 ________________________  
 325. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). 
 326. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 267 (1977)). 
 327. He was also uninterested in the School Board’s offer to establish a specific connection after finding that 
regardless of specific past discrimination, the preferential layoff remedy was too broad. Id. at 278. 
 328. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. 
 329. Using the incomplete term “many” and not the complete term “all.” Id. 
 330. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 331. Id. at 490–91. 
 332. Id. at 505. 
 333. Id.  
 334. Id. at 494. 
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 Legislation with an intent to dismantle racial hierarchy would 
therefore be afforded the same heightened scrutiny as the ascriptive laws that 
created it because otherwise “race will always be relevant in American life, and the 
ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental decision-making such 
irrelevant factors as a human being’s race will never be achieved.”
336
  
Seen through neo-liberalism’s lens, Justice O’Connor’s opinion validates the 
ideas that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed to stop illiberal State interference 
with the marketplace and protect blacks’ freedom to participate in it.
337
 The City of 
Richmond’s plan was similarly invalidated because the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited the city, a state entity, from regulating the construction industry’s free 
market or the subcontractors’ freedom to pursue economic opportunities in the 
name of racial egalitarianism.
338
 The Equal Protection Clause did not protect 
groups, an egalitarian concern, but neo-liberalism’s preferred singular unit, “any 
person.”
339
 It also worked in the service of another neo-liberal goal: removing the 
State and eliminating governmental decision-making entirely.
340
 
Justice Scalia wrote separately to concur that all racial classifications, 
regardless of benign or invidious intent, required strict scrutiny, which when 
applied to race should nearly always be fatal,
341
 regardless of how well correlated a 
specific invidious and pervasive practice of discrimination in the past was to a 
remedial plan in the present.
342
 He cited Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent to highlight 
liberalism’s dismissal of groups, noting that “our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”
343
 While Justice Scalia left the 
door open a crack for federal remedies, he agreed to curtailing States’ rights
344
 in 
addressing past discrimination because “the Civil War Amendments were designed 
to ‘take away all possibility of oppression by law because of race or color’ and ‘to 
be . . . limitations on the power of the States . . . .’”
345
 
Justices O’Connor and Scalia distinguished the limited power of states to 
address racial hierarchies relative to the federal government in Wygant and 
Croson.
346
 They justified their distinctions based upon the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s intent to curb the power of states to trample the civil rights of black 
Americans.
347
 However, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion also required that the 
entity seeking to remediate past discrimination demonstrate a specific history of 
 ________________________  
 335. Id. at 495. 
 336. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495. 
 337. See Croson, 488 U.S. 469.  
 338. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id.  
 341. Or “strict in theory, fatal in fact.” Croson, 488 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 342. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 343. Id. at 521 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 539 (1896)). 
 344. Although not necessarily as ardent a federalism champion as his colleague Justice Rehnquist, neo-
liberalism’s influence is demonstrated in its ability to overcome Justice Scalia’s preference for states’ rights. See 
id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 345. Id. at 522 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (emphasis added). 
 346. See id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 347. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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discrimination against a specific racial minority in a specific industry.
348
 Read 
together then, the Court rationalizes reducing the power of states to dismantle 
hierarchies in the present because the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to stop 
states from constructing them in the past.
349
 Conversely, the federal government—
albeit an entity certainly far from having clean hands—is given the most power in 
the present to remedy past discrimination because it did less discriminating in the 
past.
350
 With this exercise in federalism, the Court’s inversion of power and 
privilege, and culpability and responsibility, is complete. As Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson writes: 
[B]y design or effect, the Court equality doctrine reserves judicial 
solicitude primarily for historically privileged classes and 
commands traditionally disadvantaged groups to fend for 
themselves in the often hostile majoritarian branches of 
government. It its equal protection decisions, the Court has 
effectively inverted the concepts of privilege and subordination; it 
treats advantaged classes as if they were vulnerable and in need of 
heightened judicial protection, and it views socially disadvantaged 
classes as privileged and unworthy of judicial solicitude. This 




The Court reiterated its unwillingness to distinguish between hundreds of years 
of laws that sought to burden racial minorities and recent attempts to lessen the 
burdens of those ascriptive practices in Adarand v. Peña.
352
 It also ended its brief 
flirtation
353
 with allowing the federal government more latitude in addressing 
dismantling hierarchy.
354
 Neo-liberalism reached the federal government by 
extending the Court’s application of strict scrutiny for all races for any intent to 
federal programs because “the Fifth
355
 and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution protect persons, not groups,” and thus, the need for a “detailed 




 ________________________  
 348. See id.  
 349. See Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, Croson, 488 U.S. 469.  
 350. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490–91.  
 351. Darren Hutchinson, Unexplainable on Grounds other than Race: The Inversion of Privilege and 
Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 618 (2003). 
 352. Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  
 353. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564–65 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny to 
race-conscious federal program). 
 354. See generally Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or 
local governmental actor, must be analyzed under strict scrutiny). 
 355. Brown’s holding—that “separate but equal” violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the federal government and Washington, D.C. schools—was applied in a later case. Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Bolling v. Sharpe discovered a companion in the Equal Protection Clause in 
the Fifth Amendment to apply against federal action. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 356. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (emphasis in original). 
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Adarand found that differentiating between invidious and benign 
classifications “does not square” with the Court’s longstanding central 
understanding of equal protection.
357
 This is because “a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality should tolerate no retreat 
from the principle that government may treat people differently because of their 
race only for the most compelling reasons.”
358
 Adarand served then to apply Justice 
O’Connor’s neo-liberal conceptions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fifth.
359
 
Despite the histories of the two amendments being different, they are, once again, 
unified by classic liberal principles.
360
 Both amendments were ratified as bulwarks 
against State power, and each conceived their protections on an individual basis.
361
 
Moreover, beyond the language and motivations of the amendments, their 
applications are most illustrative of what really animates them. Scholars may 
contend that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to protect newly-freed 
African Americans
362
—as a class—but the language—”no person”—and the 
interpretation in subsequent precedents is best seen as addressing the equal 




Justice Scalia concurred again in Adarand to stress that the concept of “either a 
debtor or creditor race” is alien to “the Constitution’s focus upon the individual,” 
highlighting the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition against states denying to 
“any person the equal protection of the laws.”
364
 The concept of “racial 
entitlement” found in benign state practices “preserve[s] for future mischief the 
way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred.”
365
 It is 




5.   Willful Blindness 
The post-Warren Courts’ neo-liberal color-blind doctrine is a logical 
companion to its free market intent-over-impact approach within equal 
protection.
367
 Intent is the focal point in both doctrines, but as noted above, laws 
intending to aid racial minorities will be struck down, while laws without a clearly 
discernible intent to burden, yet nevertheless with a disparate impact, will be 
 ________________________  
 357. Id.  
 358. Id. at 227 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (a case upholding the 
constitutionality of racial curfews)).  
 359. Id. at 215.  
 360. See, e.g., id. 
 361. Id. at 201–02.  
 362. See, e.g., David H. Gans, The Unitary Fourteenth Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 907, 907 (2007) (citing 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
 363. See generally Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (a case applying the Equal Protection Clause). 
 364. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) (likewise, Justice Thomas stated in his concurring opinion that 
“benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination based on malicious prejudice” Id. at 241). 
 365. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239. 
 366. Id. 
  367.    See Keith R. Walsh, Color-Blind Racism in Grutter and Gratz, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 443, 460 
(2004). 
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 The two comprise a formidable intellectual trend within the American 
political and legal systems that reinforces racial inequalities.
369
 Color-blindness, for 
all of its irony, is nevertheless aptly named, and may exhibit Baldwin’s concept of 
disavowal of domination through willfully blind practices even better than the 
Court’s unwillingness to address impact.
370
 The irony is thicker, and the blindness 
even more willful, because while intent-over-impact results in the Court passively 
allowing the perpetuation of ascription, color-blind strict scrutiny requires a willful, 




Not only is the color-blind doctrine a willful attack on State efforts to 
dismantle the hierarchies they created, but the building blocks utilized to mount the 
attacks and preserve ascription are the very cases that were initially used to 
dismantle them.
372
 Justice Powell commandeered precedents that struck down 
racial segregation in marital and real estate contracts to invalidate a contract 
seeking to avoid continued segregation in education.
373
 Precedents are also stripped 
of context and purpose, and refashioned in not just a disavowal of history, but an 
inversion of it. Justice O’Connor uses a platitude about only using race for 
compelling purposes from a case justifying racial curfews
374
 in order to strike down 
efforts to address why there is a dearth of black representation in the seat of the Old 
Confederacy’s construction industry.
375
 The absence of a specific documented 
history of discrimination against racial minorities in the construction industry in 
Croson to her is thus explained by a lack of discrimination, and not complete 
foreclosure to that industry based on race, which would have precluded even the 
chance of having a business to be discriminated against in the first place.
376
 
Justice Scalia’s use of Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent
377
 is perhaps even more 
illustrative of disavowal because it is comprehensively “innocent” of precedent, 
history, and intent.
378
 Whereas Justice Harlan dissented alone in furtherance of a 
color-blind Constitution against the majority’s endorsement of an illusory equality 
that specifically contemplated the separation of two distinct races, Justice Scalia re-
imagined the majority’s illusion while inverting Justice Harlan’s doctrine in the 
creation of a race that neither one conceived of: the so-called American race.
379
 
Moreover, Justice Scalia disavowed a constitutional history of systematically 
 ________________________  
 368. See id. 
 369. See id. at 459. 
 370. BALDWIN, supra note 23, at 335–36, reprinted in SHULMAN, supra note 23, at 143. 
 371. See, e.g., Darren L. Hutchinson, Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race: The Inversion of 
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615 (2003).  
 372. Id. at 639. 
 373. See, e.g., id. at 640–44 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290–97 (1978)). 
 374. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. at 227 (1995) (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 
320 U.S. 81 (1943) (a case upholding the constitutionality of racial curfews)). 
 375. See id. 
 376. See id. at 221–24 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)). 
 377. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552–64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 378. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 521 (1989) (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting)).  
 379. Compare Plessy, 163 U.S. at 521 (Harlan J., dissenting), with Croson, 488 U.S. at 519–28 (Scalia, J. 
concurring).  
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discrimination against racial minorities because of their status in that group in 
favor of a willfully innocent celebration of a conjured record of neo-liberal 
constitutional protection for individuals regardless of racial group.
380
 Along with 
erasing distinctions between white and black in favor of a newly recognized 
“American” race, he also merged benign practices and race hatred into one 
monolithic mischievous concept of racial entitlement that the neo-liberal 
Constitution would not tolerate.
381
 
6.   The Way to Stop Discrimination 
The Roberts Court’s decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1
382
 was another significant nail in any so-called Warren 
Court egalitarian revolution. The Court announced that efforts to ameliorate drastic 
racial imbalances firmly in place, that replicate hierarchy over time and space, were 
not the way to confront discrimination.
383
 Instead, the solution lies in refusing to 
confront it at all.
384
 Justice Roberts concluded his PICS opinion by striking down 
efforts to integrate Seattle schools with the would-be dictum: “the way to stop 
discrimination based on race is to stop discriminating based on race.”
385
  
Justice Roberts’ opinion also confirmed that imbalances concerning racial 
groups were not unconstitutional.
386
 Instead, “the entire gist of the Grutter
387
 
analysis” was that the Court’s focus would be on the student or “applicant as an 
individual and not simply as a member of a particular racial group.”
388
 “The 
importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious 
admission[s] programs is paramount”
389
 because “at the heart of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must 
treat citizens as individuals.”
390
  
Finally, Justice Roberts continued the trend of inverting and re-purposing 
precedent to better coincide with neo-liberal aims.
391
 In 1954, Justice Warren made 
education akin to a fundamental right that the State had to provide to individuals 
with ostensibly equal access regardless of race, thus, resulting over time in some 
integration and improvement in opportunity for black school children.
392
 In 2007, 
 ________________________  
 380. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 519–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 381. See id.   
 382. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 383. See id. at 747. 
 384. See id. at 747–48.  
 385. Id. at 748. 
 386. See id. at 721 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)). See also Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 723 (2007) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) 
(to seek racial balances was instead “patently unconstitutional”)).   
 387. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
 388. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 722 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337) (emphasis added). 
 389. Id. at 723 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337). 
 390. Id. at 730 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting))). 
 391. See, e.g., id.   
 392. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Justice Roberts cited Brown to defeat a desegregation plan “because government 
classification and separation on grounds of race denote inferiority.”
393
  
Justice Roberts’ preference for a restrained incrementalist approach likely led 
to him employing one of the Court’s few precedents that permitted the use of race 
as a tool to dismantle educational ascription.
394
 He did so in PICS to distinguish 
why diversity’s role was not constitutionally recognized in high schools like it had 
been for higher education in Grutter v. Bollinger.
395
 His restraint—or perhaps his 
inability to make Justice Kennedy the fifth vote to sink affirmative action in public 
higher education for good—likely led to a loss for Texas and a ratcheting up of 
strict scrutiny of admissions criteria yet kept affirmative action on life support in 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.
396
  
While Justice Kennedy has been less hostile to the use of race than Justice 
Roberts has been in his early Supreme Court career, Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
contains the same neo-liberal language likely to have anchored Justice Roberts’ 
opinion.
397
 Justice Kennedy’s opening discussion of precedent reiterates the core 
liberal color-blindness principle that “equal protection admits no artificial line of a 
‘two-class theory’ that permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree 
of protection greater than that accorded others.”
398
 Instead, admissions decisions 
need to be based solely on an individual basis.
399
 Moreover, if Fisher added 
anything to constitutional affirmative action jurisprudence, it was emphasizing that 
the State carried the burden—a burden arguably increased by the Court’s 
decision—of establishing that the individual rights of white persons were not 
infringed by increasing the diversity of the classroom—by expanding the 
representation of groups of color.
400
  
The rationale of diversity as beneficial to the classroom and its students as 
opposed to the groups that actually constitute the diversity appears palatable if not 
ideal for a neo-liberal Court that cherishes the individual and ignores the 
collective.
401
 It is also consistent with the shift made in response to attacks on 
affirmative action , many spearheaded by neo-liberal arguments, made in the 
1990s. In a description of inversion similar to that made by Professor 
Hutchinson,
402
 Aida Hurtado details the shift from race-based affirmative action as 
a means to redress historical disadvantage to taking advantage of the benefits that 
 ________________________  
 393. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 746 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493–94). Justice Roberts 
expresses the same concern for the impact of integration under the force of law that Justice Warren did about 
segregation fifty-three years earlier in Brown; Justice Stevens addresses this as a “cruel irony” in his dissent. 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 394. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. 701. 
 395. 539 U.S. 309 (2003). 
 396. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 397. Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. 701 (Roberts, J.), with Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(Kennedy, J.). 
 398. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1977)). 
 399. See id. at 2411.  
 400. See id. 
 401. See id.  
 402. Hutchinson, supra note 351, at 615. 
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come from a diverse classroom.
403
 In order for affirmative action to survive, its 
benefits had to be recast as favoring white students; and thus, the focus became 
emphasizing how a diverse classroom benefits not all students, but white students, 
who can learn something from hearing diverse viewpoints in their classrooms.
404
 
Hurtado expresses this paradox by explaining that: 
[t]he irony in the argument is that, while both [w]hite students and 
students of color would benefit from a more diverse education at 
all levels, the only diversity worthy of consideration is that which 
research documents as beneficial to [w]hite students. In this vein, 
the burden of establishing positive returns from the diversification 




With Fisher, the Court tightened this burden: in addition to the already 
daunting task of catching up to those already so far ahead, historically 
disadvantaged students must now add the task of convincing the Court that their 




Like the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era before it, “intellectual systems 
and political forces defending racial . . . inequalities”
407
 have increased in the post-
Civil Rights Era with the Burger, Rehnquist, and now Roberts Courts’ use of equal 
protection.
408
 While the intent behind a system to effectuate “[c]onservative desires 
[to keep] blacks in their place” with “[c]omplex registration systems, poll taxes, 
and civics tests” was “little masked” in the “heyday of Jim Crow,”
409
 the post-
Warren Courts’ equal protection doctrine requires intent to be surreptitious enough 
to not be discernible.
410
 Facially neutral statutes can ostensibly comport with 
liberalism’s promise of equal laws if not equal results, while historically revisionist 
platitudes about free people in our nation’s equal institutions,
411
 and our one 




Inequality is conceded by intent only, color-blind practitioners, but the nascent 
anti-subordination jurisprudence started by the Warren Court soon gave way to the 
anti-classification approach that stabilizes change, neutralizes efforts to dismantle 
 ________________________  
 403. Aida Hurtado, Toward a More Equitable Society: Moving Forward in the Struggle for Affirmative 
Action. 28 THE REV. OF HIGHER EDUC. (ISSUE NO. 2) 273 (Winter 2005). 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at 276. 
 406. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 407. Smith, supra note 1, at 563. 
 408. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (applying the 
Equal Protection Clause).  
 409. Smith, supra note 1, at 561. 
 410. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 708-48. 
 411. See Klarman, supra note 104, at 297–99. 
 412. See id. at 300. 
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hierarchy, and perpetuates ascription.
413
 The Court has steadily moved away from 
race-conscious laws, reconstructing, if not new, systems of hierarchy, at least a 
doctrine that maintains them by favoring the laissez-faire approach of self-help to 
combat inequality.
414
 Further, most of the Warren Court’s precedents attempting to 




With the exception of attempts by the Warren Court to break the “barren 
repetition of a nightmarish racial past,”
416
 the neo-liberal Burger, Rehnquist, and 
Roberts Supreme Courts have utilized novel conceptions of an Equal Protection 
Clause ratified to aid newly freed slaves to instead “reinvigorate (or at least 
preserve) the hierarchies [esteemed (or tolerated) by Americans] in modified 
form.”
417
 The Clause has largely not, as Cass Sunstein has asserted, looked forward 
to dismantle engrained prejudices,
418
 but instead maintained them by enabling 
Justices to disavow a history based on color in order to repeat it.
419
 
B.   An Island [of Which the State May Not Enter], Alone 
The Substantive Due Process Clause proved to be a major, if imperfect, tool for 
civil rights litigators in the second half of the twentieth century. Its current status as 
the bête noir of judicial conservatives
420
 overshadows its initial use as one of their 
favored weapons to combat economic regulation in the first half of last century.
421
 
While judicial conservatives enjoyed its service in the first half of the century to 
preserve the Gilded Age, and judicial liberals re-purposed it for civil rights in the 
second half, it has been consistently faithful to liberalism’s preference for an 
unregulated economy, property and individual rights free from State intrusion.
422
 
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur
423
 the Court struck down illiberal 
State paternalism that required pregnant school teachers to take unpaid maternity 
leave five months before their due dates and permitted a return to work only after 
their children were at least three months old.
424
 The Court instead ruled in favor of 
an individual’s freedom to choose when to leave and when to return to the 
 ________________________  
 413. For a thoughtful analysis discussing the Court’s preference for an anti-classification approach over an 
anti-subordination principle in the interest of institutional stability, see Stuart Chinn, Race, the Supreme Court, 
and the Judicial-Institutional Interest in Stability, 1 J.L. & COMMENTARY 95 (2011). 
 414. Smith, supra note 1, at 563 (referencing Richard Epstein, Thomas Sowell, Booker T. Washington, and 
color-blind jurist Clarence Thomas). 
 415. See Klarman, supra note 104, at 279–80, 284. 
 416. SHULMAN, supra note 23, at 142. 
 417. Smith, supra note 1, at 558. 
 418. Contra Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between 
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988). 
 419. See Hurtado, supra note 403. 
 420. See generally ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
31 (Robert H. Bork ed. 1990) (describing substantive due process as a “momentous sham”).  
 421. See generally id. at 46–49 (referring to the Lochner era). 
 422. Compare Lochner v. People of the State of New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 423. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
 424. Id.   
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 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
426
 the Court rejected zoning 
ordinances in favor of the free exercise of property and the protection of the 
“private realm of family life which the [S]tate cannot enter.”
427
 A year later the 
Court struck down a Wisconsin law that prohibited persons with non-custodial 
children from marrying without first obtaining a court order demonstrating that 
they were financially supporting their children, in Zablocki v. Redhail.
428
 
Wisconsin may have had an interest in promoting and protecting the welfare of 
children within the State, but those concerns gave way to the personal right to enter 
into a marriage contract.
429
 The freedom to marry was an extension of the right to 
privacy,
430
 once again combining liberalism’s favored sons of contract and 
property.  
The Court’s fidelity to neo-liberalism was severely tested in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,
431
 a case pro-life forces had been working on for nearly two 
decades.
432
 Emboldened by adding Reagan and Bush appointees to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s Court, Roe had been given its last rites by social conservatives, while 
parts of the women’s equality movement were resigned to the demise of a woman’s 
right to choose.
433
 The decision, however, written by the Republican-triumvirate of 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, reported that the Court’s duty was to 
“define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral code.”
434
 Instead of 
bowing to the Right’s call for the state’s regulation of an individual’s reproductive 
health, Justice O’Connor’s opinion relied on the familiar string citation of liberal 
precedent elevating an individual’s right to privacy as property, developed in 
Griswold, and later styled as liberty protected under substantive due process, and 
found in favor of individual choice free from State intrusion.
435
 This was because, 
“[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that there is a personal realm of liberty which 
the government cannot enter,”
436
 which explained why the Court had an established 
history of “recogniz[ing] ‘the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted government intrusion . . . .’”
437
 
1.   Illiberal Redux: Liberalism v. Homophobia 
While neo-liberal decisions have achieved a measure of equal opportunity if 
not equal results for traditionally discrete groups, there remain indiscrete groups 
 ________________________  
 425. Id.  
 426. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).  
 427. Moore, 431 U.S at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
 428. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 429. See id. at 388. 
 430. See, e.g., id. at 397 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
 431. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 432. Since Roe v. Wade, 410  U.S. 113 (1973) was decided.    
 433. See generally Casey, 505 U.S 833 (the make-up of the Court has drastically changed since Roe). 
 434. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850. 
 435. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. 833, with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 436. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847. 
 437. Id. at 851 (emphasis in original). 
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that must still confront facially discriminatory state action.
438
 Unlike the 
reconstituted system of racial ascription at work in the Court’s intent over impact 
and color-blind doctrines that Rogers Smith warns about, anti-gay state action 
represents not a neo-liberal entrenchment of an old ascriptive order, but the 




Ten years after illiberal state regulation targeting homosexuals narrowly 
prevailed in Bowers v. Hardwick,
440
 neo-liberalism overcame the State of 
Colorado’s naked hostility in Romer v. Evans.
441
 Justice Kennedy’s opening 
paragraph took the State to task for violating its “neutrality where the rights of 
persons are at stake.”
442
 His opinion does evince a concern with “a bare desire to 
harm . . . a group,” yet Romer is driven not by the equality of homosexuals, but by 




While the State of Colorado proffered First Amendment freedom of association 
justifications for its exclusion of legal protection for homosexuals, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion traced an unregulated market and unfettered access to public 
goods back to a common law prohibition on “innkeepers, smiths and others who 
‘made a profession of public employment’ [from refusing] without good reason to 
serve a customer.”
444
 The State’s attempt at precluding homosexuals from full 
participation in “housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare services, 
private education and employment” was a “severe consequence” that a neo-liberal 
Court could not abide.
445
  
While Romer’s neo-liberal rationale was reminiscent of a Blackstonian 
Buchanan concern for the free alienation of property, Lawrence v. Texas
446
 was a 
victory for the rights of gays and lesbians achieved through the Warren-Brandeis 
property as privacy paradigm.
447
 Lawrence relied again on the same individual-
liberty
448
-over-state-intrusion string cite found in Casey to bar the government from 
entering a person’s bedroom, straight or gay.
449
 Justice Kennedy’s opinion revisited 
 ________________________  
 438. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  
 439. See Smith, supra note 1, at 550. 
 440. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Bowers’ decisive fifth vote to permit Georgia’s criminalization of sodomy was 
quickly—yet still belatedly—retracted by Justice Powell, who remarked “I think I probably made a mistake in that 
one.” Joan Biskupic & Fred Barbash, Retired Justice Lewis Powell Dies at 90, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 26, 
1998, at A1.). 
 441. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 442. Id. at 623 (emphasis added). 
 443. Id. at n.11.  
 444. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627 (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 
515 U.S. 557, 571 (1995)). 
 445. Id. at 629. 
 446. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 447. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. 620.  
 448. Formerly and briefly known as “privacy.” See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 449. Justice Kennedy and the majority resisted Justice O’Connor’s approach in her concurrence advocating 
the application of the law—and thus allowing the State into the bedroom—to both “straight” and “gay” sodomy. 
See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
39
: E Pluribus Unum: Liberalism's March
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2013
88 Barry Law Review Vol. 19, No. 1 
 




Similarly to Romer where Justice Kennedy was also the author of the Court’s 
opinion, Lawrence discusses “[e]quality of treatment…[the] right to demand 
respect,” stigmas and how homosexuals are demeaned by anti-sodomy laws.
451
 The 
crux of the opinion, however, as it was in Lawrence, was that, “[t]he Texas statute 
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal 
and private life of the individual.”
452
 While Romer relied on the Equal Protection 
Clause and Lawrence exclusively on substantive due process, both of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinions made overtures to gay equality, but rested on the vindication 
of neo-liberal rights to liberty and real property; viz, what to do with it
453
 or what 
can be done inside of it.
454
  
Through the logic and language of neo-liberalism, homosexuals were afforded 
greater access and opportunity to housing, commerce, and education, i.e., the 
market.
455
 Moreover, the discrete nature of sexuality as opposed to race could mean 
that legitimate equal opportunity free from illiberal animosities could translate into 
more equality in results and status for homosexuals. A neo-liberal equal 
opportunity approach, divorced from the past that continues to operate in the 
present, merely hits pause on the stratification of wealth and opportunity for 
blacks.
456
 However, neo-liberalism for indiscrete groups not facing steep 
hierarchies built easily in the past on readily identifiable characteristics, and 
unburdened in the present from illiberal animosity, could hasten the march toward 
full civil rights. 
The most recent and visible example of this march to expand civil right for 
homosexuals can be seen in United States v. Windsor.
457
 While the Court passed 
for the time being on the bigger question of a federal constitutional right to same-
sex marriage in Hollingsworth v. Perry
458
 allowing in effect if not intentional 
design for the right to marry to continue to expand on a state level,
459
 Justice 
Kennedy wrote his third opinion favorable toward rights for gay Americans in 
seventeen years.
460
 The majority opinion in Windsor contains even more analytical 
 ________________________  
 450. Id. at 562. 
 451. Compare Romer, 517 U.S. 620, with Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 452. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 453. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (renting or buying real property was one 
of many liberties involved in Romer). 
 454. The torrent of scholarship that Lawrence provoked included a substantial portion commenting on its 
libertarian roots. See, e.g., Davin J. Hall, Not So Landmark After All? Lawrence v. Texas: Classical Liberalism 
and Due Process Jurisprudence, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 617, 650 (2004) (“Classical liberalism was the 
ideological underpinning for the aspirations of the Constitution”); Park, supra note 70, at 838 (The Lawrence 
decision was “an accurate understanding of the libertarian underpinnings of American constitutionalism”); 
BARNETT, supra note 70. 
 455. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 454. 
 456. See, e.g., id. 
 457. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 458. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 459. The following states legalized same-sex marriage after the Supreme Court ruled in June: New Jersey, 
Hawaii, Illinois, New Mexico, and Utah. 
 460. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
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language than Romer and Lawrence, discussing in detail the equality, dignity, and 
respect involved in affording the same constitutional rights to homosexuals that 
heterosexuals enjoy.
461
 It is once again anchored, however, by a discussion of “the 
right to marry,” and notably commences by mentioning a significant $363,053 tax 
bill levied by the government against Edith Windsor as a result of her being denied 
the right to legally marry her partner of thirty-six years.
462
 Justice Kennedy’s 
federalism/equal protection hybrid analysis of precedent begins with Loving v. 
Virginia
463
 and liberal principle of limiting the states’ interference with individual 
rights, noting that “state laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must 
respect the constitutional rights of persons.”
464
 
Justice Kennedy emphasizes the unique and singular role that states have 
played in defining marriage to the exclusion of the federal government.
465
 The crux 
of his opinion, however, as lamented by Justice Scalia’s dissent, is that states 
should regulate less and defer to the individual rights of all citizens—gay or 
straight—in marriage contracts.
466
 Despite Justice Kennedy’s assertion that “[t]he 
State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance in this case 
quite apart from principles of federalism,” his emphasis instead focuses on a 
“resulting injury and indignity (from denying marriage to same-sex couples) [that] 
is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.”
467
 The terms used cast the federal government as a discriminating 
agent against the Fifth Amendment rights of liberty guaranteed to individuals; 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis, however, also applies to the thirty-eight states that still 
defined marriage as only being valid between one man and one women, thus 
implicating those states as interfering with the rights of individuals to marry as a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
468
 
 ________________________  
 461. Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 462. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
 463. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 464. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691. 
 465. “Consistent with this allocation of authority, the Federal Government, through our history, has deferred 
to state-law policy decision with respect to domestic relations.” Id. “The significance of state responsibilities for 
the definition and regulation of marriage dates to the Nation’s beginning.” Id.  
 466. “[T]oday’s prohibition of laws excluding same-sex marriage is confined to the Federal Government 
(leaving the second, state-law shoe to be dropped later, maybe next Term),” a bemoaning similar to a prediction 
made in Lawrence ten years previous that invalidation of sodomy laws would beget invalidation of laws banning 
same-sex marriage. Id. at 2705. 
 467. Id. at 2692. 
 468. Id. at 2706. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia dissented, pointing out that, 
[t]he only possible interpretation of [the majority’s opinion] is that the Equal Protection 
Clause, even the Equal Protection Clause as incorporated in the Due Process Clause, is not 
the basis for today’s holding. But the portion of the majority opinion that explains why 
DOMA is unconstitutional (Part IV) begins by citing Bolling v. Sharpe, Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno, and Romer v. Evans—all of which are equal protection cases. And 
those three cases are the only authorities that the Court cites in Part IV about the 
Constitution’s meaning, except for its citation of Lawrence v. Texas (not an equal-protection 
case) to support its passing assertion that the Constitution protects the “moral and sexual 
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Justice Kennedy acknowledges as much, repeating that “[t]he States’ interest in 
defining and regulating the marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees, 
stems from the understanding that marriage is more than a routine 
classification.”
469
 While he mostly maintains throughout the opinion that his 
analysis concerns DOMA’s interference with “the States in the exercise of their 
sovereign power,” Justice Kennedy’s proclamations of federalism are routinely 
followed—in most cases immediately—by stressing the importance of the freedom 




Amendment’s Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses are offered as the applicable constitutional provisions 
in Windsor and nominally, this would appear correct given that DOMA was a 
federal statute.
471
 Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, however, with all of his references 
to the freedom to choose, the right to marriage, and dignity and respect, make 
Windsor not a state’s rights opinion but an individual rights against State regulation 
of marriage contracts opinion.
472
 These individual—or two individuals joined as a 
couple—rights, stemming from the marital contract are largely financial, found 
with respect to healthcare benefits, bankruptcy protection, taxes, social security, 
financial aid, and disparate consequences in criminal law.
473
 Whether provided by 
the protections of liberty in the due process and equal protection guarantees of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of which Justice Kennedy does not clearly 
specify, perhaps purposefully to the chagrin of Justice Scalia, what is discernible is 
once more liberalism’s preference of withdrawing State regulation—federal or 
state—in favor of individual rights to freely contract is vindicated.
474
 
Further, as noted in previous cases, not only is an individual’s right to contract 
with another individual at stake, but also her ability to contract with the vendors, 
merchants, and proprietors involving goods and services attendant to formally 
wedded couples.
475
 The vast economic incentives and advantages enmeshed in the 
American marriage contract have unsurprisingly become the basis for some 
conservative support for permitting same-sex marriage. 
  
See also id. at 2709 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (referring to the assertion that the 
majority’s holding is confined to those already married as “bald” and “unreasoned”)) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 469. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
 470. Id. at 2693. 
 471. Id. at 2695. 
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. at 2694–95. 
 474. Id. 
 475. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/79054/here-comes-the-groom 
(presciently laying the foundation for conservatives and all political persuasions in 1989 when same-sex marriage 
was hardly conceivable to anyone); Richard Thaler at U Chicago: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/business/gay-marriage-debate-is-about-money-too.html (a more recent 
economic argument in favor of same-sex marriage); Dr. Badgett at UCLA on Department of State: 
http://fpc.state.gov/210811.htm (conducting a macro study estimating a $1.4 billion positive impact on U.S. 
economy as a result of recent legalization of same-sex marriage; See also Dr. Badgett conducting a similar study 
for Australia: http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Badgett-Smith-Econ-Impact-Marriage-Feb-
2012.pdf (discussing the hundreds of millions of dollars impact on the Australian economy if same-sex marriage 
were legalized); and same-sex marriage’s positive economic impact on a micro scale 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/06/same.sex.marriage.economy/. 
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CONCLUSION: OUT OF MANY, ONE 
Rogers Smith’s Multiple Traditions thesis persuasively characterizes American 
political culture as a historical blend of liberal and illiberal ascription based on race 
and sex, and to a lesser extent, republican traditions.
476
 The Supreme Court’s 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to civil rights decisions has largely 
illustrated these competing ideologies.
477
 While evidence of each political theory 
can be found in the Court’s civil rights jurisprudence—some more heavily than 
others depending on the period—liberalism is virtually omnipresent. While it 
competed against virulent strands of American ascription at the country’s inception 
into the twentieth century, and a nominal egalitarian revolution during the Warren 
Court, a resurgent neo-liberalism in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement saw a 
near singular and dispositive preference for liberal notions of individual rights and 
deregulation take hold. 
The Court’s neo-liberal fixation on an atomized and colorblind intent-over-
impact approach in the present leaves the steep hierarchies of the past intact. 
Discrete minorities that were once victims of illiberal animosity toward entire 
groups are now viewed by neo-liberalism as individuals expected to achieve the 
same results under the guise of an equal opportunity scrubbed of the past. While 
neo-liberalism dominates at the Court, vestiges of illiberal Americanism in race 
and sex (along with the different manifestations that the Court is beginning to 
grapple with) increasingly remain. Indiscrete groups—homosexuals in particular—
may be able to call on the Court’s inclination toward individual rights and 
deregulation to strike down illiberal State homophobia. While the neo-liberal 
American state abdicates its duty to remediate the damage its illiberal tradition has 
done to its discrete groups, a hands-off equal opportunity approach could be what 
indiscrete groups such as homosexuals need in order to move toward full equality. 
 
 ________________________  
 476. See generally Smith, supra note 1. 
 477. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 
273 (1979), Harper v. Va. State Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). 
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